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ABSTRACT 
When two or more people are alleged to have committed a crime together they are 
automatically tried together in a joint trial. Defendants can apply to have a joint trial 
severed into separate trials, but they are rarely granted. However, joint trials might be 
biasing against defendants in that they might have a greater likelihood of obtaining a 
guilty verdict than if they had separate trials. A review of the literature indicated that 
authors have several hypotheses why joint trials might be biasing, though there is no 
conclusive evidence that this is the case. This study used a mock juror paradigm to 
investigate whether joint trials are biasing toward defendants. Results indicated that 
there was not a significant difference in the proportion of guilty/not-guilty verdicts 
across one, two, and three-defendant trial conditions when all defendants involved 
were charged with the same offence (assault). It was concluded that having multiple 
defendants in a trial was not, on its own, biasing against the first or second 
defendants. However, having a co-defendant with a more serious charge (grievous 
bodily harm) led to a significant increase in the proportion of guilty verdicts assigned 
to the defendant in two out of three scenarios. It was concluded that it is possible that 
being paired with a co-defendant who has a more serious charge is biasing, but future 
research needs to assess this factor more thoroughly to make firmer conclusions. 
Therefore, it might be important for judges to consider differences in charge 
seriousness when deciding whether to grant separate trials to defendants who apply 
for them. It is suggested that there was little information for participants in this study 
to remember and organise, compared to the amount of information presented in real 
trials. Further, damaging inadmissible evidence against defendants was not included 
in this study. Future research should investigate the effects of length and complexity, 
and inadmissible evidence to assess for any biases against joint trial defendants. 
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CHAPTER! 
INTRODUCTION 
Jurors in criminal court trials are required to remember enormous amounts of 
information and are without access to the transcripts in deliberation (Kaplan & 
Schersching, 1981 ). Some courts have allowed jurors to take notes during the course 
of a trial, but notetaking is rarely allowed or encouraged in courts (Bourgeois, 
Horowitz, & FosterLee, 1993). Keeping all the facts straight may be a difficult task 
for jurors and there may be some confusion even when there is only one defendant. If 
there is more than one defendant in a trial it can make the task even more difficult. A 
trial with more than one defendant is referred to as a "joint trial" (Kidston, 1953). 
This thesis was designed to assess for any bias against defendants in joint trials, 
defined in this study as an increase in the proportion of guilty verdicts in joint trial 
versus separate trial conditions. 
The legal issues pertaining to joint trials will be addressed in Chapter 2 by 
discussing the relevant legislation in Western Australia, some commonly cited 
reasons for and against joint trials, and two legal cases. Chapter 3 provides a review 
of the psychological literature and gives direction for the present research. The 
literature review begins by addressing findings in impression formation research. 
Impressions are thought to be an appropriate area to start with because of the 
connection between jurors' impressions of defendants and their resulting verdicts 
(Tanford & Penrod, 1984; Vrij, 1997). Further in the literature review, the ability of 
jurors to disregard inadmissible evidence is analysed because of the increased 
likelihood of such evidence being presented in joint trials (Weinberg, 1984) compared 
to single defendant trials, and because such evidence appears to influence jurors' 
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decisions regarding the guilt or innocence of defendants ( e.g., Rind, Jaeger, & 
Strogmetz, 1995; Sue, Smith, & Caldwell, 1973). Next, research findings indicating a 
bias in cases where one defendant is charged with multiple offences are outlined in 
the literature review to provide a rationale for joint trial research. Finally, the 
literature review concludes with a discussion of the only study the present author has 
found on joint trial research (Clayton, 1989), to provide a more solid rationale for the 
present study. 
Chapter 4 specifies the design and hypotheses of the present study. The Pilot 
Study and Main Study's method and results are described in Chapters 5 and 6, 
respectively. Finally, Chapter 7 provides a discussion of this study's findings, its 
limitations, and some suggestions for future research. 
CHAPTER2 
LEGAL BACKGROUND 
If two or more people are accused of committing a crime together, they are 
generally tried together in the same trial by the same jury. For example, section 
586(7) of the Western Australian Criminal Code (hereinafter referred to as the 
"Criminal Code") states that, "Any number of persons charged with committing 
different or separate offences may be charged in the same indictment and tried 
together if the offences arise substantially out of the same or closely related facts," 
(p. 295). 
Any of the accused persons may apply for a separate trial at any stage of a 
joint trial, and the resulting decision is at the judge's discretion (Kidston, 1953). 
Separate trials may be applied for as set out in Section 624 of the Criminal Code: 
When 2 or more persons are charged in the same indictment, whether with 
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the same offence or with different offences, the court may at any time during 
the trial, on the application of any of the accused persons, direct that the trial 
of the accused persons, or any of them, shall be had separately from the trial of 
the other or others of them, and for that purpose may, if a jury has been sworn 
discharge the jury from giving a verdict as to any of the accused persons. 
(p.320). 
A review of the case law indicates that in the following four circumstances 
severance of trials should be considered, though it is not automatically justified. 
Firstly, when one or more defendants is likely to have highly prejudicial inadmissible 
evidence heard against him/her in court as the result of a co-defendant ( e.g., R v. 
Demirok, 1976). Secondly, when there is little duplication of evidence across the 
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defendants' cases (e.g., R v. Darby, 1982). Thirdly, when the jury would likely be 
incapable of considering the case against each defendant separately ( e.g., Domican 
and another, 1989). Fourthly, when a joint trial is expected to be excessively complex 
and/or lengthy ( e.g., R v. Novae and others, 1976). However, judges appear reluctant 
to separate joint trials, as can be seen in the comments of Starke, Crockett, and 
Fullagar JJ., " .. undoubtedly it is only in exceptional cases that accused persons .... will 
be permitted to stand trial separately," (in R. v. Ditroia and another, 1981, p.247). 
Reasons for joint trials 
There seem to be four main reasons for judges' reluctance to grant separate 
trials. First, joint trials are often thought to be more cost efficient than separate trials 
for each defendant; there is only one jury, one courtroom, and one judge required 
(Just, 1988). Since at least some evidence is the same for the co-defendants, separate 
trials are thought to take more time and more money ( e.g., R. v. Demirok, 1976). 
Second, joint trials save the same witnesses from coming into court to testify more 
than once (Finlay, 1991; R. v. Demirok, 1976). Third, the jury in a joint trial is said to 
get more of the whole story, or a clearer picture of what allegedly occurred in joint 
trials because in separate trials only the evidence relevant and admissible to the 
accused person at trial is presented (Finlay, 1991). Finally, it is suggested that verdicts 
in joint trials are more consistent across defendants because they are being judged by 
the same jury, and therefore it is deemed fairer to defendants that their co-defendants 
are judged similarly (R. v. Demirok, 1976). While there are clearly some advantages 
of joint trials, the literature suggests that there are also several disadvantages, which 
are discussed next. 
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Reasons for separate trials 
In legal commentaries ( e.g., Just, 1988), two main reasons are often suggested 
for severing joint trials: longer trial times and confusion of jurors in joint trials. Both 
factors can potentially lead to limiting jurors' abilities to distinguish between 
defendants' evidence and give independent verdicts. These two factors will be 
addressed in turn. 
Joint trials tend to be longer than separate trials because evidence for more 
than one defendant is presented (Judge, 1990). Longer trials often result in more 
inconvenience for jurors and more information to remember. The more information 
people have to remember (Watkins & Watkins, 1975) and the longer the delay 
between encoding and retrieval (Shepard, 1967), the less likely they will be able to 
recall the information correctly. Further, as mentioned before, because the jury is not 
given the transcripts of trial proceedings (Kaplan & Schersching, 1981) and because 
few jurors take notes about the evidence given (Bourgeois et al., 1993), they are not 
given an optimal chance ofremembering details accurately. Therefore, the sheer 
length of joint trials appears to make it difficult for jurors to fulfill their roles 
optimally. 
In joint trials, jurors' roles involve considering each defendant's case 
separately to give independent verdicts (Kidston, 1953). However, jurors' confusion 
of the evidence may act as a bias that renders them incapable of correctly 
distinguishing between defendants' cases and therefore incapable of giving 
independent verdicts (Kidson, 1953). An example of where biases might come into 
play in joint trials is when the defendants blame each other for committing the alleged 
offence. This situation is common in joint trials (Weinberg, 1984). In such cases, the 
jury might think that one defendant is definitely guilty, and they may use relative 
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judgments to determine which one is guilty, rather than using the absolute 
independent judgments that they are instructed to use (Kidson, 1953). It might 
become a matter of who they believe looks more honest/less criminal than the other 
defendant, or which defendant seems less credible than the other and so on. However, 
each defendant should be judged according to the evidence against him or her alone, 
and should not be compared to co-defendants in determining their guilt or innocence 
(Kidston, 1953). Instructing jurors to give independent verdicts does not necessarily 
mean they end up doing so (Finlay, 1991). 
Another potentially biasing factor cited in case law as reason for separating 
joint trials is inadmissible evidence ( e.g., R v. Demirok, 1976). Inadmissible evidence 
is that which has been presented in court that the judge has ruled that the jury must 
not consider in reaching their verdicts (Pickel, 1995). It is possible that evidence 
admissible in respect of one or more defendants is not admissible in respect of one or 
more of the other defendants. The judge might rule that the evidence is inadmissible 
for particular defendants or for all defendants. A common scenario is where one 
defendant has made an admission also implicating his co-defendant (Just, 1988). In 
such cases, that admission is only admissible for the defendant who made the 
admission and not for the co-defendant who was implicated in the admission. 
Therefore, in such cases the jury is instructed by the judge to disregard that particular 
evidence for the co-defendant and only consider the evidence in the case of the 
defendant who made the admission. 
It is argued by some researchers (e.g., Rind et al., 1995; Sue et al., 1973) that 
jurors are either not able to disregard such evidence, or that they choose not to 
disregard it. Indeed, there have been several legal cases where separate trials were 
been deemed necessary by the trial judge because of the likelihood of overwhelming 
prejudicial inadmissible evidence against one or more of the defendants (e.g., 
Domican and another, 1989). There have also been several cases where the appellate 
court has ruled that there was a miscarriage of justice because a joint trial was not 
separated (e.g., R. v. Gibb and another, 1983; R. v. Demirok, 1976). 
Legal cases 
Domican and another. 1989 
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The leading case in Australia regarding joint versus separate trials is Domican 
and another (1989). Domican and Thurgar were jointly charged with conspiring to 
murder a prison officer and Thurgar was also charged with attempted murder. The 
evidence against Thurgar "consisted of oral confessions and his possession of a pistol 
and photographs of the intended victim," (p. 24). The evidence against Domican 
included "statements he made to other prisoners and to a prison officer indicating a 
desire to kill, and of an arrangement with T[hurgar] to carry out that killing," (p.24). 
Subsequent to an attempt to carry out the murder, Thurgar was apprehended. 
He made statements to police that Domican was involved in the plan ( conspiracy) to 
murder the prison officer. This evidence would be admissible against Thurgar but not 
against Domican, though it clearly implicates the latter. Both accused made 
applications for separate trials. The Crown opposed the application. Hunt J stated, 
"the presence in the trial of Thurgar' s statement will inevitably have an effect upon 
the jury's consideration of that particular issue, no matter what directions may be 
given to them to ignore that statement," (p. 27). 
Separate trials were granted to the two accused based on the following issues 
stated by Hunt J: 
1) The evidence against each accused was significantly different and almost 
entirely separate. Further, T[hurgar]'s statements directly implicating 
D[omican] were .... inadmissible against D[omican]. 
2) It would be difficult for a jury in a joint conspiracy trial to understand they 
could possibly convict T[hurgar] but acquit D[ omican] on evidence only 
admissible against each separately. An accused's statement implicating, yet 
inadmissible against, the other, would inevitably have an effect on the jury no 
matter what directions were given. The real issue was whether such prejudice 
was avoidable without injury to the administration of justice. 
3) The case against Domican was considerably weaker. 
4) On experience, a joint trial often took longer than two separate trials and 
involved no saving of time. 
5) Had T[hurgar]'s been the only application it would not have been granted on 
the basis put forward. (p. 24) 
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The basis of Hunt J's decision to sever the trial appears to have been that it would 
be too prejudicial to Domican for a joint trial to continue with Thurgar as a co-
defendant A review of the case law indicates that the level of expected prejudice in a 
joint trial must be substantial to warrant severing the trials; showing that some 
prejudice exists is generally not enough for the trial judge to sever a joint trial ( e.g., R. 
v. Grondkowski and another, 1946). It appears from the Law Reform Commission of 
Victoria (1985) that cost is weighed up against prejudice and justice when they 
reported that, "joint trials, despite the prejudicial effect on the co-accused, are 
generally necessary for reasons of expedience and cost," (p. 67). 
R v. Novae and others. 1976 
Some joint trials take weeks or months to complete and therefore appear to make 
the whole process more complicated. An example is R v Novae and others (1976). 
The trial involved four defendants and 19 counts. The trial took 4 7 working days and 
the last four full days consisted of the judge summing up the case. Bridge L.J. of the 
Court of Appeal stated that such trials should be severed because of the "immense 
burden on both judge and jury," (p. 118). There was a large amount of inadmissible 
evidence against the defendants that was heard by the jury. Bridge L.J. also indicated 
that too much was expected of jurors in this case when he stated, "it is by no means 
cynical to doubt whether the average juror can be expected to take it all in and apply 
all the directions given ... .injury trial brevity and simplicity are the hand-maidens of 
justice, length and complexity its enemies," (p. 119). 
In some cases joint trials are viewed as biasing towards defendants and are 
separated, often based on an assumption that juries are not capable of keeping the 
evidence separate because of the added complexity in many joint trials (e.g., R v. 
Novae and others, 1977; Domiean and another, 1989). If joint trials are indeed 
biasing, the factors involved may include trial complexity. Another possible factor 
that needs investigation is that of prejudice against joint trial defendants. 
A review of the psychological literature, starting with impression formation, will 
now provide a basis for the suggestion that jurors might be more biased negatively 
against defendants in joint trials than those in separate trials. 
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Impression Formation 
CHAPTER3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
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Research has shown that jurors' negative impressions of defendants contribute 
to a higher rating of defendants' guilt (Tanford & Penrod, 1984 ). If it can be 
established that jurors form more negative impressions of defendants in joint versus 
single defendant trials, it would imply that joint trial defendants might be more likely 
to receive guilty verdicts. Such an effect would constitute a bias (as defined in 
Chapter 1) against joint trial defendants. 
One factor well-researched in impression formation involves the effects of 
first impressions. First impressions often form quickly, with little information and 
tend to have disproportionate weight in resulting impressions (Asch, 1946; Kelley, 
1950). One such study on this "primacy effect" is that of Anderson and Barrios 
(1961). They found that information presented first often formed a larger proportion 
of the resulting impression, compared to the weight of information presented later. 
People were found to subsequently select information that was consistent with their 
initial impression. Further, Fiske (1980) found evidence for a "negativity bias", that 
is the tendency for negative information to have a disproportionately heavy weight in 
forming impressions. Therefore, according to the impression formation research 
presented above, if negative information is presented first, a negative impression is 
likely to ensue despite subsequent positive information (Asch, 1946; Kelley, 1950; 
Anderson & Barrios, 1961; Fiske, 1980). 
The connection of impression formation research to possible joint trial biases 
involves the order in which information (not only evidence) is presented to jurors. 
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Before any evidence is presented to jurors in a trial, the defendants are in view. The 
jurors might, at that early stage with little information, begin to form an impression of 
the defendants (Vrij, 1997) . .lfthis impression is negative, it might be difficult for 
jurors to form a positive impression even in light of subsequent positive information 
(i.e. pro-acquittal evidence) (Fiske, 1980). A lasting negative impression might 
eventually lead to a higher likelihood of a guilty verdict (Tanford & Penrod, 1984). 
The question that remains is whether the presence of multiple defendants in a trial 
initiates a negative impression. There are several possible reasons why negative 
impressions might be formed of defendants in joint trials. 
One reason involves the mere idea of multiple defendants. Multiple defendant 
trials may imply to jurors that at least one defendant is guilty and they must only 
discover which one. The vital procedural legal rule "innocent until proven guilty" 
(Wells & Weston, 1977) may be shifted in joint trials to "which one(s) is guilty?" 
Another reason why joint trials might lead jurors to form more negative 
impressions of the defendants compared to single defendant trials is the association of 
one defendant with another. If jurors have a negative impression of one defendant, 
they might form a similar negative impression of the co-defendant merely because 
he/she is associated with the first defendant. In other words, the co-defendant might 
be viewed as guilty by association. 
To explain this notion of guilty by association, social categorisation theory is 
useful (Levine & Campbell, 1972). It suggests that people process information in such 
a way that other people are assigned to either the in-group (part of "us") or part of an 
out-group (part of"them"). If jurors see the defendants as different from themselves, 
as part of an outgroup, then it may have adverse consequences for the defendants as a 
group. People assigned to outgroups are typically viewed as homogenous (e.g., "they 
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all look the same" in terms ofracial out-groups) (Judd & Park, 1988). The 
implications of such outgroup categorisations for joint trials may be that even if just 
one defendant is thought to be guilty, jurors may assume that the other defendants are 
also guilty, since they form part of the same peer group. In other words, it may take 
just one guilty verdict for one defendant to classify the group of defendants as a 
"criminal outgroup". As such, defendants might be found guilty by mere association 
(Popovski & Rudnick, 1990). 
In summary of the research in impression formation, it clearly indicates that 
people may form impressions quickly and with little information (Asch, 1946; Kelley, 
1950). Further, people are not likely to change such impressions over time, especially 
negative ones (Fiske, 1980; Kelley, 1950; Anderson & Barrios, 1961). Therefore, if 
appearing in court with co-defendants is biasing then such defendants appear to be 
subjected to an unfair trial because jurors are apt to retain their negative impressions 
of the defendants despite evidence that contradicts the negative impression formed. 
Subsequent inconsistent information (i.e. in deliberation) might not be capable of 
reversing such negative impressions because of the strong weight negative 
impressions generally have. One way that joint trials might be biasing is simply 
having a co-defendant. Such a situation may increase jurors' belief that the guilty 
person is present but they just need to figure out which one. The other suggested 
reason why joint trials might be biasing is through the negative impression of a co-
defendant. 
There remains a further possibility why joint trials might be biasing against 
defendants. A defendant in a joint trial might be more likely to have negative 
information presented about him/her than he/she would have in a separate trial. This 
issue involves inadmissible evidence. 
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Disregarding inadmissible evidence 
As mentioned previously,judges instruct and expect jurors to ignore any 
information deemed inadmissible by him or her (Kidston, 1953). Jurors are not told 
that such information is false, but rather just to disregard is as if they never heard it in 
the first place. There appears to be a higher likelihood of inadmissible evidence in 
joint trials than in single defendant trials (Weinberg, 1984). Research discussed below 
indicates that mock jurors typically do not disregard inadmissible evidence (Rind et 
al., 1995; Sue et al., 1973). As such, joint trials might be more biasing against 
defendants in part because of the increase in inadmissible evidence presented to 
jurors. 
Rind and colleagues (1995) presented mock juror subjects with damaging 
inadmissible evidence ( confession via an illegal wiretap). They found that the 
inadmissible evidence played a role in participants' decision-making, despite 
instructions to disregard the information. Specifically, more guilty verdicts were 
assigned to the defendant when the inadmissible evidence was presented than when it 
was not presented. However, when the seriousness of the offence was increased, the 
participants did not use the inadmissible evidence. Perhaps subjects were more apt to 
follow the rules when the stakes were higher (i.e. the defendant may get a severe 
penalty). Seriousness of crime therefore appears to play a role in whether mock jurors 
disregard inadmissible evidence. Strength of evidence also appears to play a role, as 
described in the next study. 
Sue, Smith and Caldwell (1973) presented mock jurors with either weak or 
strong evidence against a defendant. Participants heard either: a) additional damaging 
evidence ruled admissible, b) additional damaging evidence ruled inadmissible and c) 
no additional evidence (control group). Overall, mock jurors in the inadmissible 
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evidence condition convicted significantly more than those in the control group who 
never heard the additional damaging evidence. However, there was an effect of 
evidence strength. In the strong evidence condition, participants did not use the 
inadmissible evidence presented to them. Thus, mock jurors seem not to need the 
extra evidence to find the defendant guilty when the evidence is already strong against 
the defendant, but used the extra evidence when the evidence is weak. Overall, mock 
jurors tend to use inadmissible evidence even when instructed not so, and this 
generally leads to an increase in guilty verdicts. 
After having considered research in impression formation and disregarding 
inadmissible evidence, the next step appears to be to examine the effects of multiple 
defendants in a trial in order to assess for a bias against such defendants. 
Unfortunately, there is negligible research on the effects of joint trials. However, a 
situation that is similar in some ways to joint trials, and an area which has been 
researched, is that of joinder of offences. 
Joinder of offences research 
The situation where a defendant is charged with more than one offence in a 
single trial is referred to as "joinder of offences" (Bordens & Horowitz, 1985). For 
example, the defendant may be charged with one count of theft, one count of assault, 
and one count of resisting arrest, all in the one trial. The Criminal Code permits the 
joinder of offences in certain circumstances. Section 585 states: 
Provided that when several distinct indictable offences form or are part of a 
series of offences of the same or a similar character or when several distinct 
indictable offences are alleged to be constituted by the same acts or omissions, 
or by a series of acts done or omitted to be done in the prosecution of a single 
purpose, charges of such distinct offences may be joined in the same 
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indictment against the same person. (p. 294). 
As in the case of joint (multiple defendant) trials, defendants in joinder ( of 
offences) trials can apply to have their counts heard separately in separate trials. 
Section 585 of the Criminal Code sets out this possibility "if ... it appears to the court 
that the accused person is likely to be prejudiced by suchjoinder," (p.294). However, 
separate trials for multiple offences are rarely granted, for much the same reasons that 
joint trials are rarely separated: cost and time efficiency, consistent verdicts across 
counts, convenience of witnesses and so on (Weinberg, 1982). 
In trials involving a joinder of offences, juries are instructed to distinguish 
between evidence for each charge and give independent verdicts for each of the 
charges in the indictment (Bordens & Horowitz, 1983). Therefore, any evidence 
against the defendant for one count cannot (or should not) be used by the jury in 
considering the evidence and verdict for another count. However, mock jurors in 
joinder trial studies typically assign more guilty verdicts in joinder of offences trials 
than when the identical charges are severed into separate trials ( e.g., Bordens & 
Horowitz, 1983; Greene & Loftus, 1985; Horowitz, Bordens, & Feldman, 1980). 
These findings indicate that cases involving multiple offences are biasing toward 
defendants. It is possible that such jurors do not ( or cannot) completely distinguish 
evidence for each count separately, or alternatively that they have a biased impression 
of defendants charged with multiple offences that leads them to assign more guilty 
verdicts to defendants in joined trials. Another finding, labelled the "joinder effect" 
was that the first offence presented resulted in more guilty verdicts compared with 
later offences (Bordens & Horowitz, 1983; Horowitz, Bordens, & Feldman, 1980). 
The researchers suggested that this finding might be due to the mock jurors' need to 
find the defendant guilty of at least one charge, and that if the defendant was found 
guilty on the first charge then there was not as much pressure to find him guilty on 
subsequent charges. 
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A review of the literature has clearly indicated that cases withjoinder of 
offences appear to be biasing toward defendants (Bordens & Horowitz, 1983; Greene 
& Loftus, 1985; Horowitz, Bordens, & Feldman, 1980). However, the case of joint 
(multiple defendant) trials has yet to show any conclusive patterns (Clayton, 1989). 
Joint trial research 
Unlike the research available on the effects of joinder of offences, research on 
the effects of joint trials is negligible. An unpublished honours thesis is the only study 
that the present author found on the effects of joint trials (Clayton, 1989). Clayton did 
a series of experiments with two defendants in joint trial conditions and the same two 
defendants (same scenario) but in separate trials. In all experimental trials participants 
read prepared trial transcripts. One experimental trial had three conditions: joint, 
separate trial for first defendant, and separate trial for second defendant. The scenario 
involved two independent drivers who were charged with the death of a third person. 
The results indicated that the first defendant received significantly more guilty 
verdicts in the joint trial compared to his separate trial. The second defendant did not 
receive a differing number of guilty verdicts in separate versus joint trial conditions. 
Clayton found that acquittals for both defendants were extremely uncommon, as were 
convictions for both defendants. A common pattern was therefore finding only one 
defendant guilty, suggesting that the mock jurors might have used relative culpability 
judgments, for example "which one is more guilty?" 
Another experimental trial in Clayton's (1989) research involved two people 
who allegedly committed a burglary together. The three conditions were joint, 
separate for first defendant, and separate for second defendant. This experiment also 
included the situation referred to earlier as "joinder of offences" in that one of the 
defendants was charged with two offences. Results showed that for both defendants, 
the joint trial resulted in significantly more guilty verdicts than for their respective 
separate trials. Therefore, a bias against these joint trial defendants was evident. 
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The last experimental trial in Clayton's (1989) study involved a change to the 
scenario with an increase in seriousness of offence (murder) for the second defendant. 
The results of this experiment contrasted with those of the earlier experimental trials 
in that they did not show an increase in the proportion of guilty verdicts in the joint 
trial condition for either defendant compared to their separate trials. It is possible that 
because the second defendant was charged with murder it made the first defendant 
( charged with theft) appear less guilty. To explain the results for the second defendant 
(no increase in guilty verdicts in joint trial), it is possible that his case was so different 
from his co-defendant's case because of the immense difference in seriousness of 
offence that it was as ifhe had a separate trial. It appears possible that such a large 
difference in offence seriousness (murder vs. theft) makes the evidence for each 
defendant's case more easily distinguishable than if they were charged with more 
similar offences. 
To summarise Clayton's (1989) research, the first two sets of experiments 
resulted in increased proportions of guilty verdicts assigned to at least one defendant 
of the joint trials compared to their respective separate trials. However, in the last 
experiment, the offences differed largely between the two defendants and there was 
no such biasing effect of joint trials found. 
As previously mentioned, Clayton's research is the only experiment the 
present author could find involving the effects of joint trials. Since the various 
components of psychological research ( e.g., impression formation, disregarding 
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inadmissible evidence, joinder of offences) point to the possibility that joint trials are 
biasing against defendants, it is necessary to continue on from Clayton's study to 
examine the effects of joint trials to reach a more solid conclusion on the implications 
of joint trials. The present study was designed to make the effects of joint trials 
clearer. 
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CHAPTER4 
THE PRESENT STUDY 
Purpose 
Prior research in the areas of impression formation, disregarding inadmissible 
evidence, joinder of offences, and joint trials has highlighted the need for an 
exploratory study into the possible biases of joint trials. "Bias" against defendants in 
this study is defined as an increase in the proportion of guilty verdicts. 
The main purpose of this study was to examine the effects (if any) that joint 
trials have on the proportion of guilty verdicts assigned to defendants, compared to 
their severed trials. This bias may result from confusion of information, from negative 
judgments about multiple defendants or from another source. Since the information 
that the participants in this study received about the trials was quite short in length, 
confusion of information factors will probably be minimal in this study. If an effect is 
shown against multiple defendants in this study, it is more likely to be a result of 
negative judgments that jurors might hold about defendants in joint trials. 
The second purpose of this study was to identify any biases against defendants 
depending on the charge their co-defendant (equally serious or more serious). There 
are three possible patterns that might emerge from the data. Firstly, being paired with 
a co-defendant with a more serious charge might result in an increase in guilty 
verdicts. Such a result would suggest that jurors might have believed that the 
defendant's propensity to commit crime increased as a result of his pairing with a co-
defendant charged with a more serious offence. Secondly, being paired with a co-
defendant with a more serious charge might lead to a decreased number of guilty 
verdicts. This result would imply that jurors contrasted the two defendants and the 
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defendant with the less serious charge appeared less criminally-inclined, or to have a 
reduced propensity to commit crime. Lastly, being paired with a defendant with a 
more serious charge might not lead to any change in the number of guilty verdicts. It 
might be that the seriousness of the charge(s) against one's co-defendant is not 
relevant in assessing the first defendant's culpability. 
The third and final aim of this study was to assess the confidence ratings of 
participants who assign not-guilty verdicts. It is suggested that even if joint trial 
conditions are not biasing in terms of increased proportion of guilty verdicts, jurors 
might display less confidence in defendants' innocence as a result of the joint trial. 
General Design 
Participants listened to an audiotape of a hypothetical criminal trial summary 
involving one of the following four conditions: 
1. One Defendant (Defendant A) 
2. Two Defendants (Defendant A and Defendant B) 
3. Three Defendants (Defendant A, Defendant B, and Defendant C) 
4. Two Defendants (Defendant A and Defendant D) 
Defendants A, B, and Care all charged with the same offence (assault) and the 
seriousness of their alleged offences was thought by the author to be equal. Defendant 
Dis charged with a more serious offence (grievous bodily harm) than Defendants A, 
B, and C. (Therefore, in terms of crime seriousness, A=B=C<D). To ensure that 
participants interpreted offence seriousness as intended (A=B=C<D), a pilot study 
was carried out. It was decided arbitrarily that the accepted criterion would be at least 
15 out of 20 participants rating the seriousness of offences as A=B=C<D. Participants 
in the pilot study read the joint trial summary involving all four defendants (A, B, C, 
and D) and then gave Likert-type ratings on a scale of one to seven indicating the 
seriousness of each defendant's charge. The main study proceeded without any 
alterations to scenarios because the seriousness of charges was judged as planned 
(A=B=C<D) by 18 out of20 participants. 
There were two independent variables in the main study: 1) number of 
defendants in the trial ( one, two, or three). 2) The seriousness of the charge against 
Defendant A's co-defendant(s), either equal (Defendant B) or more serious 
(Defendant D). Mock juror participants gave guilty/not-guilty verdicts (dependent 
variable #1), and the effect of joint trials were analysed in terms of the effects on 
Defendant A only. The other data collected from participants was a rating of their 
confidence in the they assigned to defendants (dependent variable #2). 
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There are several design features that require explanation. First, as mentioned, 
participants listened to an audiotape of a trial summary, rather than a trial transcript. 
Trial transcripts are better in that they give more details and give a first hand account 
of the proceedings, however, they are also longer than summaries and would therefore 
take more of participants' time to complete. Further, audiotapes have the advantage of 
presenting the information in the same form as most testimony, that is, in an audio 
format. 
Other design features of this study were decided upon to make the situation of 
the mock juror participants more realistic and to control for certain variables. Firstly, 
participants listened to an audiotape of the criminal trial summary. An audiotape was 
chosen over a videotape to prevent the physical appearances of the defendants 
affecting jurors' impressions of defendants. Physical appearances have been found to 
influence mock jurors' impressions of defendants ( e.g., V rij, 1997). Although each 
defendant would have the same physical appearance in each condition they were 
presented in (i.e., Defendant A would have the same appearance across the 4 
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conditions), the interaction with a co-defendant's appearance could have an effect on 
the verdicts given for Defendant A. For example, the mock jurors might have found 
Defendant C to look "more guilty" than Defendant A on such subjective measures as 
build, cleanliness, posture and so on . While physical appearance can affect jury 
decision-making and therefore is a relevant issue to examine in further studies, it was 
controlled for in this exploratory study to maximize the validity of conclusions with 
respect to number of defendants and seriousness of offence. Secondly, an audiotape 
was also the preferred option over a written summary to be able to control the 
exposure time to the stimulus, to ensure that the speed of delivery was equal for all 
participants, and to prevent participants from re-reading parts of the summaries. 
Thirdly, dichotomous guilty/not-guilty verdicts were chosen over a Likert-type 
continuous rating scale with guilty and not-guilty at opposite ends of the scales. The 
advantage of Likert-type scales is that they enable the use of tests with more strength 
(i.e. more likely to find significant differences ifthere are differences). However, 
jurors in real trials must give a dichotomous guilty/not-guilty verdict, and this mode 
of response was chosen as it is deemed important to retain as many factors as possible 
to enhance the similarity between real trials and this jury-simulation trial situation. 
Fourthly, although group deliberation in reaching verdicts did not occur in this study, 
the testing was carried out in groups of five to 12 participants to enhance as much as 
possible the group situation of a real court trial. 
Participants were treated in accordance with the "Ethical Principles of 
Psychologists and Code of Conduct" (American Psychological Association, 1992), 
and the study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the School of Psychology. 
Hypotheses 
1) More guilty verdicts will be assigned to a defendant in a criminal trial if that 
defendant is joined by one or more co-defendants. 
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2) Jurors will be less confident when they assign a not-guilty verdict to a defendant 
in a criminal trial if that defendant is joined by one or more co-defendants. 
3) The number of guilty verdicts assigned to a defendant will be different depending 
on whether he has a separate trial or is paired with a co-defendant with a more 
serious charge. 
4) The number of guilty verdicts assigned to a defendant will be different depending 
on whether he is paired with a co-defendant with a more serious charge or an 
equally serious charge. 
METHOD 
Participants 
CHAPTERS 
PILOT STUDY 
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Undergraduate students of various disciplines from Edith Cowan University 
participated. Participants were primarily recruited from a list of students who 
voluntarily agreed to be placed on a list of potential participants for study. Several of 
the participants from the list who volunteered for this study also invited acquaintances 
from disciplines other than psychology and non-student acquaintances and they also 
participated. Each participant received a raffle ticket to win a $50 prize. These raffle 
tickets were arranged by the School of Psychology as an incentive to participate in 
research. 
There were 20 participants in the pilot study. Within this sample were eleven 
male participants (55%). Participants' ages ranged from 18 to 29 years with a mean 
age of 22.1 years. There was only one condition in the pilot study and therefore all 
participants performed the same activity. 
Materials 
An Information Sheet was used to explain to the participants what the study's 
aims were and what they would be expected to do if they decided to participate (See 
Appendix A for the Pilot Study Information Sheet). The Informed Consent Form was 
used to ensure that all participants were participating voluntarily and knew their rights 
as participants (See Appendix B). There was also space on this sheet for participants 
to record their age and gender, however names were not recorded. 
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For the pilot study, a five-page (2810 words) summary of a hypothetical 
criminal trial with four defendants was used. The transcript scenario will be briefly 
outlined here, and the complete transcript can be viewed in Appendix C. The general 
scenario consisted of an alleged nonsexual assault against a man in the downtown 
Perth area. The charges were introduced and relevant Criminal Code sections were 
listed. Next, the prosecution examined each of their witnesses with the defence cross-
examining each witness. The defence then examined each of their witnesses with the 
prosecution cross-examining each of those witnesses. The prosecution then gave their 
summation followed by the defence's summation. Lastly, the judge gave instructions 
outlining the "beyond a reasonable doubt" criterion and the need to give independent 
verdicts assigned to each defendant. 
The last item used in the pilot study was a sheet for participants to rate their 
judgements of the seriousness ( on a scale of one to seven) of each of the four 
defendants' charges (See Appendix D). 
Procedure 
The acceptable criterion to proceed with the main study without alterations to 
the transcripts was arbitrarily set as at least 15 out of20 participants responding in the 
expected manner (A=B=C<D). Participants in the pilot study took part individually. 
They were first asked to read the Information Sheet. If they still chose to participate in 
the study they were given the Consent Form to view. They were also asked to record 
their age and gender on this form and then the experimenter collected the consent 
forms. They were then given the five-page trial summary and were asked to read it 
only once. After participants finished reading the trial summary they were given the 
response sheet, where they recorded their ratings of the seriousness of the four 
defendants' charges. The response sheets were collected by the experimenter. The 
participants were then debriefed about the study and were thanked for their 
participation. 
RESULTS 
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Results were that 18 out of the 20 participants rated the seriousness of the 
defendants' charges in the expected manner (A=B=C<D) and therefore it was decided 
to continue with the main study without altering the transcripts. 
METHOD 
Participants 
CHAPTER6 
MAIN STUDY 
27 
One hundred participants took part in the main study. They were recruited in 
the identical manner as in the Pilot Study. Their ages ranged from 18 to 54 years with 
a mean age of27.6 years. Female participants made up 64% of the sample. 
Participants were assigned to each of the four conditions according to the session time 
they attended. There were 25 participants in each of the four conditions. 
Materials 
An Information Sheet was provided to potential participants to inform them of 
the study details (See Appendix E). A Consent Form identical to that used in the Pilot 
Study was also used (Appendix B). 
An audiotape detailing the summarised accounts of a hypothetical criminal 
trial was used. The tape consisted of four different trial scenarios that made up the 
four conditions of this study. The four scenarios were prepared by breaking down the 
trial summary from the pilot study. The first trial condition was 931 words in length 
and consisted of one defendant (A) (Appendix F). The second trial condition was 
1525 words in length and consisted of two defendants with the same charge (A and 
B) (Appendix G). The third trial condition was 2043 words in length and consisted of 
three defendants with the same charge (A, B, and C) (Appendix H). The fourth trial 
condition was 1752 words in length and consisted of2 defendants (A and D) with one 
defendant (D) having a more serious charge than the other defendant (A) (Appendix 
I). The general scenario of the audiotape was the same as for the pilot study. The 
voice for each of the four scenarios was that of the same male reader. 
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A response sheet was used, detailing participants' verdict for each defendant 
in their condition (guilty or not-guilty) and a rating of the participants' confidence in 
their verdicts, on a scale of one to seven (Appendices J, K, L, M, for Conditions 1, 2, 
3, 4 response sheets, respectively). 
A room in the language laboratory of Edith Cowan University was used to run 
the study. There were approximately 20 desks in the room. Each desk had a set of 
headphones hooked up to it. There was a main desk at the front of the room that the 
experimenter used. The audiotape played by the experimenter at the front desk was 
heard by each participant simultaneously through their respective headphones. 
Procedure 
Participants in the main study took part in groups of five to 12 participants. 
The groups had been arranged by the experimenter by telephone prior to the study. 
Participants chose one of the 17 time slots over a period of two weeks that best suited 
them and they were booked in for that time slot. Each time slot was assigned one of 
the four conditions of the study and the experimenter assigned the conditions such 
that each condition would end up having an equal number of participants. There was 
an average of six participants per time slot. 
Participants were seated at a desk with headphones attached to it. They were 
then asked to read the Information Sheet. If they still chose to participate in the study 
they were given the consent form to view. They were also asked to record their age 
and gender on this form and then the experimenter collected the consent forms. 
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Instructions on an audiotape were played to the participants as follows: "you 
are about to hear about a criminal trial here in Perth. Please imagine that you are one 
of the jurors in that trial." 
The experimenter then played one of four audiotape versions that had been 
assigned to the particular time slot. After the tape segment finished, participants filled 
out the response sheet. The response sheets were collected by the experimenter. The 
experimenter then debriefed the participants, answered any questions from the 
participants, and thanked them for their time and effort. 
Statistical Analyses 
Data collected from each participant in each of the four conditions (A, AB, 
ABC, and AD) included a guilty/not-guilty verdict and a rating of confidence in the 
verdict given for each defendant. To test the effect of the number of defendants 
(independent variable #1) on the proportion of guilty/not-guilty verdicts (dependent 
variable #1), a 3x2 Chi-square analysis was completed. Confidence ratings (dependent 
variable #2) for the number of defendants in three conditions were analysed using an 
ANOVA. 
To test the effect of the seriousness of the charge of one's co-defendant 
(independent variable #2) on the proportion of guilty/not-guilty verdicts (dependent 
variable #1), two 2x2 Chi-square analyses were used. Confidence ratings (dependent 
variable #2) of the verdicts in the two conditions were analysed using at-test. 
RESULTS 
Data collected were verdicts assigned to each defendant in the trial condition 
(guilty or not guilty) and a confidence rating of the verdict (on a scale of one to 
seven). Table 1 illustrates the number of guilty and not-guilty verdicts in all four 
conditions for each defendant involved. 
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Table 1 
Number of Guilty and Not-guilty Verdicts as a Function of Condition and Defendant 
Condition Verdict Defendant 
A B C D 
1 (A) Guilty 6(24%) X X X 
Not guilty 19(76%) X X X 
2 (AB) Guilty 10(40%) 11(44%) X X 
Not guilty 15(60%) 14(56%) X X 
3 (ABC) Guilty 5(20%) 7(28%) 6(24%) X 
Not guilty 20(80%) 18(72%) 19(76%) X 
4 (AD) Guilty 13(52%) X X 15(60%) 
Not guilty 12(48%) X X 10(40%) 
Note. Percentages indicate the proportion of guilty/not guilty verdicts for each 
condition for each defendant. 
Both guilty and not-guilty verdicts were analysed when the chi-square 
analyses were done. When comparing average confidence ratings in guilty and not-
guilty verdicts, inferential statistics were also employed. The number of cases in each 
cell was high enough to allow that, as all guilty verdicts were pooled across the four 
conditions, as were all not-guilty verdicts. All other inferential comparisons only used 
not-guilty verdicts, as the numbers were too low in most cells with guilty verdicts. 
Effect of number of defendants on verdicts assigned 
Effect on first defendant (A) 
Verdicts assigned to Defendant A in Conditions 1, 2, and 3 (A, AB, ABC) 
were analysed using a Chi-square test. Number of defendants in the trial (one, two, or 
31 
three) was not found to affect the proportion of guilty verdicts the first defendant (A) 
received, x2 (2, N = 75) = 2.778, 12 = .249. For the same groups, analysis of 
confidence ratings for not-guilty verdicts assigned to Defendant A showed 
significantly higher confidence in Condition 3 (ABC) (M = 4.45, SD= 1.47) than in 
both Condition 1 (A) (M = 3.47, SD= 1.17), ! (37) = -2.287, 12... = .028 and Condition 2 
(AB) (M = 3.13, SD= 1.77), ! (33) = 2.406, 12 = .022. This finding does not support 
the earlier finding that number of defendants did not have an effect. There was no 
significant difference between Conditions 1 (A) and 2 (AB),! (32) = .674, 12 = .505, 
which does support the finding that number of defendants does not have an effect. 
Effect on second defendant (B) 
A post-hoc analysis revealed a similar finding with respect to the second 
defendant (B), where the proportion of guilty verdicts assigned to Defendant B did not 
differ significantly between the 2-defendant condition (AB) and the 3-defendant 
condition (ABC), x2 (1, N=50) = 1.389, 12 = .239. Confidence ratings for the same 
conditions (AB and ABC) revealed significantly higher confidence in not-guilty 
verdicts assigned to Defendant B in Condition 3 (ABC) (M = 4. 72, SD = 1.67) than in 
Condition 2 (AB) (M = 2.93, SD= 1.9), !_(33) = 3.021, 12 = .005. This latter pattern is 
similar to the pattern found for Defendant A, in that the number of defendants did not 
affect the number of not-guilty verdicts, and that Condition 3 (ABC) resulted in the 
highest confidence ratings for not-guilty verdicts compared to Conditions 1 (A) and 2 
(AB), as reported above. Therefore, neither the first defendant (A) nor the second 
defendant (B) appeared to be disadvantaged by being presented in a joint trial with co-
defendants with equal charges. 
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Effect of order on culpability 
Further post-hoc analyses indicated that in the 2-defendant condition (AB), 
Defendants A and B were assessed as being equally culpable in terms of guilty/not-
guilty verdicts assigned to each of the defendants, x,2 (1, N = 50) = .0821, p >.05. 
Confidence ratings in the not-guilty verdicts assigned to Defendants A and B in 
Condition 2 (AB) were also similar, t(27) = .301, p = .766, which is consistent with 
the results for the number of not-guilty verdicts. Likewise in the 3-defendant 
condition (ABC), the three defendants were assessed as being equally culpable, x,2 (2, 
N = 75) = .4386, p > .05, and the confidence ratings were not significantly different 
among the 3 defendants' not-guilty verdicts, F (2, 54) = .251, p = .779. These 
confidence results are consistent with the verdict results that order of defendants did 
not have an effect on their culpability. Since Defendants A, Band C were judged as 
being equally culpable, the rest of the results are limited to responses regarding 
Defendant A only. 
Confidence ratings between guilty/not-guilty verdicts 
Table 2 shows the confidence ratings of guilty and not-guilty verdicts assigned 
to each condition. In general, confidence ratings were significantly higher for guilty 
verdicts (M = 4.94, SD= 1.35) than for not-guilty verdicts (M = 3.77, SD= 1.49), 
irregardless of condition, t(98) = -3.84, p <.01. This result was expected since 
participants were instructed to only render guilty verdicts when they were sure beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty. 
Table 2 
Mean Confidence Ratings of Guilty and Not-guilty Verdicts by Condition and 
Defendant 
Condition Verdict Defendant 
A B C D 
1 (A) Guilty 4.17(1.47) X X X 
Not guilty 3.47(1.17) X X X 
2 (AB) Guilty 5.1(1.29) 5.18(1.72) X X 
Not guilty 3.13(1.77) 2.93(1.9) X X 
3 (ABC) Guilty 5(1) 5.2(.76) 4.67(1.37) X 
Not guilty 4.45(1.47) 4.72(1.67) 4.79(1.62) X 
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4 (AD) Guilty 5.15(1.46) X X 5.27(1.16) 
Not guilty 3.92(1.24) X X 4.1(.99) 
Notes. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Confidence scale of 1 to 7, where 
1 = not very confident and ?=very confident. 
Effect of seriousness of co-defendant's charge 
A comparison was made of verdicts assigned to Defendant A between 
Condition 1 (A) and Condition 4 (AD) using a Chi-square test, to assess the impact of 
having a co-defendant with a more serious charge than himself. There was a 
significant difference, x2 (1, N = 50) = 4.16, .Q = .041 indicating that compared to the 
single defendant condition (A), the 2-defendant trial condition with Defendant A 
paired with Defendant D (who has a more serious charge) led to a significant increase 
in the proportion of guilty verdicts assigned to Defendant A. 
To further assess the impact of seriousness of charge, another comparison was 
made of verdicts assigned to Defendant A between Condition 2 (AB) and Condition 4 
(AD) using a Chi-square test. The proportion of guilty verdicts did not differ 
.. 
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significantly between the two conditions, x2 (1, N = 50) = .725, ~ = .395. Therefore, 
having a co-defendant with a more serious charge did not affect the proportion of 
guilty verdicts compared to having a co-defendant with an equally serious charge. 
A post-hoc comparison of verdicts assigned to Defendant A between 
Condition 3 (ABC) and Condition 4 (AD) revealed a significantly higher proportion 
of guilty verdicts in Condition 4 (AD) than in Condition 3 (ABC), x2 (1, N = 50) = 
5.556, ~ = .018. This result is consistent with the comparison between Conditions 1 
(A) and 4 (AD) that indicated that having a co-defendant with a more serious charge 
was a disadvantage. However, both of those comparisons are inconsistent with the 
comparisons between Conditions 2 (AB) and 4 (AD) that indicated that there was no 
significant disadvantage. 
Since the comparison between Conditions 2 (AB) and 4 (AD) was not 
consistent with the other two comparisons, confidence ratings for not-guilty verdicts 
for Defendant A were analysed for Conditions 2 (AB) and 4 (AD). This comparison 
was performed to assess whether the mock jurors were less confident in their not-
guilty verdicts for Defendant A in Condition 4 (AD) than in Condition 2 (AB). Such a 
result would indicate that although the verdict results did not show an effect of 
seriousness, the confidence ratings did show an effect. Further, it would show 
additional support for the suggestion that seriousness of charge plays a role in juror 
decision making. At-test was used for this analysis. Participants who gave not-guilty 
verdicts in Condition 2 (AB) did not rate themselves as having significantly different 
confidence levels (M = 3.13, SD= 1.77) from those in Condition 4 (AD) who gave 
not-guilty verdicts (M = 3.92, SD= 1.24), ! (25) = -1.30, ~ = .21. Therefore, these 
results were not consistent with the findings from the comparison of verdicts in 
Conditions 1 and 4 and Conditions 3 and 4. Overall, the comparison of verdicts in 
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Conditions 1 and 4 and Conditions 3 and 4 indicate that being paired with a co-
defendant with a more serious charge is a disadvantage, whereas the comparisons for 
number of defendants and confidence ratings between Conditions 2 and 4 indicate that 
there is no significant disadvantage. 
Effect of order on culpability 
CHAPTER 7 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
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Although most of the evidence tendered against Defendants A, B, and C was 
different, the type of evidence presented against each defendant was similar. For 
example in all three instances there was eyewitness testimony and circumstantial 
evidence. Analyses assessing culpability of defendants based on order revealed that 
the order in which defendants were presented in the case did not appear to affect their 
culpability. That is, Defendants A and B were assessed as being equally culpable in 
Condition 2 (AB), and further, Defendants A, Band C were assessed as being equally 
culpable in Condition 3 (ABC). These results suggest that for a trial with two or three 
defendants, the order in which they are presented in the trial does not appear to 
advantage or disadvantage one or other of the defendants. These results might be 
limited to the present scenario, where the type of evidence was similar for all three 
defendants. 
Effect of number of defendants 
The first hypothesis, that defendants in joint trials would obtain more guilty 
verdicts than defendants in single defendant trials, was not supported. In this study, 
Defendant A was no more likely to obtain a guilty verdict when he was in a joint trial 
with one or two other defendants with the same charge as himself, than when he was 
at trial on his own. Likewise, Defendant B was no more likely to obtain a guilty 
verdict when he was in a joint trial with two other defendants than when he was in a 
trial with just one other defendant. Therefore, increasing the number of defendants in 
the trials did not appear to disadvantage either the first or second defendants in this 
study. These findings are in contrast to research on the effects of joinder of offences 
(e.g., Horowitz, Bordens, & Feldman, 1980; Bordens & Horowitz, 1983; Green & 
Loftus, 1985) and on joint trial research (Clayton, 1989). Further research should 
assess these differences to provide an explanation of the inconsistent findings. 
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With regard to the confidence ratings for not-guilty verdicts, the second 
hypothesis that those in the joint trial conditions would have less confidence than 
those in the single defendant condition was not supported. Therefore adding a co-
defendant to Defendant A's trial did not lead jurors to express less confidence in their 
not-guilty verdicts. In fact, the results indicated a pattern in the opposite direction than 
was hypothesised. 
Participants in the three-defendant condition were significantly more confident in 
their not-guilty verdicts for Defendant A than were participants in either the single 
defendant or the 2-defendant conditions. This pattern is similar to that of the number 
of not-guilty verdicts for those three conditions. For instance, Condition 3 (ABC) had 
the highest number of not-guilty verdicts, and confidence in not-guilty ratings was 
highest in Condition 3 as well. For Condition 1 (A), confidence ratings for not-guilty 
verdicts and the number of not-guilty verdicts were both in between those for 
Condition 3 (ABC) and for Condition 2 (AB). Condition 2 (AB) had the lowest 
number of not-guilty verdicts and the lowest confidence levels for not-guilty verdicts 
across Conditions 1, 2 and 3. Such similar patterns for verdicts and confidence ratings 
might suggest some overall logical pattern. However, after examining several 
different possible explanations, the author has concluded that indeed there is not a 
logical pattern in the above findings. First, if adding Defendant B was the critical 
factor in the differences among Conditions 1, 2 and 3, then adding Defendant B to 
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Condition 1 (A) to make Condition 2 (AB) should yield a difference in the same 
direction as that of Condition 3 (ABC). Seeing that Condition 2 and Condition 3 differ 
from Condition 1 in opposite directions, then it is concluded that Defendant B is 
probably not the critical factor. If on the other hand, adding Defendant C is the critical 
factor in the differences, then Condition 1 should have received a number of not-
guilty verdicts more similar to Condition 2 than Condition 3. However, this is not the 
case as in Condition 1 not-guilty verdicts are closer in number to Condition 3 than 
Condition 2. Seriousness of charge and culpability are also equal in all three 
conditions. Apart from the specific defendants presented in the conditions, one might 
consider the number of defendants as a potential critical factor in the pattern. 
However, there is not a logical pattern, as the I-defendant condition is in between the 
2- and 3-defendant conditions in terms of number of not-guilty verdicts and 
confidence ratings of not-guilty verdicts. If there was a logical pattern, the author 
would expect a pattern such as Condition 1, 2, 3 or Conditions 3, 2, 1 in terms of 
ranking the number of not-guilty verdicts or confidence ratings. Therefore, although a 
similar result pattern exists across Conditions 1, 2 and 3 for both number of not-guilty 
verdicts and confidence ratings of not-guilty verdicts, it is suggested that there is not a 
logical explanation for this pattern, shown by rejecting the potential critical factors for 
a logical explanation. Further research in this area will hopefully provide a clearer 
conclusion. 
Possible explanations for the lack of effect of number of defendants 
There are four main possible explanations for the finding that increasing the 
number of defendants in the trial did not increase the proportion of guilty verdicts or 
affect the confidence ratings of the jurors' not-guilty verdicts. The first possibility is 
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that joint trials where all defendants are charged with the same offence are no more 
biasing (in terms of increased likelihood of guilty verdicts) than single defendant 
trials. Considering that separate trials are rarely granted to defendants, this 
explanation should be pleasing to those involved in refusing separate trials Gudges), 
defendants in joint trials, and people in the wider community who hope for justice in 
the legal system. 
The second possibility explaining a lack of bias against joint trial defendants in 
this study is that there might be a bias but it might have been controlled by the jurors. 
For example, the mock jurors in this study might have compensated for their bias 
against multiple defendants and as a result might have been more cautious in 
examining the evidence against each defendant. Therefore, there may be a bias in 
jurors' minds but they may be able to adjust their decisions accordingly. 
The third reason why jurors might not have assigned more guilty verdicts to joint 
trial defendants is that all the evidence might have been be too confusing or too 
overwhelming for the jurors. They may consequently decide not to convict rather than 
make an inaccurate decision that could have immense negative consequences for the 
defendant(s). 
The fourth main possible explanation why biases in joint trial conditions were not 
found in this study, and one that deserves more thought and study, is that the present 
study was not conducive to a bias that may actually exist against joint trial defendants. 
Three factors that were absent from this study but might be biasing against joint trial 
defendants are: appearance of defendants in court, a lengthy trial, and damaging 
inadmissible evidence against one or more of the defendants in the joint trial 
conditions. These three factors will be discussed in tum. 
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Firstly, with respect to appearance in court, it is possible that jurors do not form a 
bias against defendants in joint trials unless they actually see them in court. Perhaps it 
is the appearance of more than one defendant together in the dock that creates the 
impression that "someone up there is guilty." Without defendants' appearance 
together, the jurors' bias might be absent. 
Secondly, with respect to trial length, the factors of information overload and 
confusion of evidence arise. Some studies on the joinder of offences ( e.g., Horowitz, 
Bordens, & Feldman, 1980; Bordens & Horowitz, 1983; Green & Loftus, 1985) 
suggest that the increased number of guilty verdicts in such cases was due to the 
confusion of evidence in the trials, stemming from having too much information to 
remember and to organise effectively. Likewise, it is possible that the complexity and 
length of real joint trials is biasing against defendants. It may well be that the present 
study did not find any bias against joint trial defendants because there was not enough 
information to confuse the jurors; perhaps it is the overload of confusing information 
in many real joint trials that may lead jurors to give more guilty verdicts. Since the to-
be remembered information in this study was minimal in comparison to the amount of 
information in a real trial, this study was not able to test such effects of trial length or 
complexity on the proportion of guilty verdicts in joint trials. Future research should 
assess these factors. 
Thirdly, inadmissible evidence was not included in this study but may in fact lead 
to biases against joint trial defendants. Inadmissible evidence is more likely in joint 
trials (Weinberg, 1984) and jurors in research do not typically disregard inadmissible 
evidence (Rind et al., 1995; Sue et al., 1973). Therefore, joint trials might be biasing 
against defendants because of the increase in likelihood of biasing inadmissible 
evidence being used against them. 
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Effect of seriousness of co-defendant's charge 
With respect to seriousness of charges, Defendant A received a significantly 
higher proportion of guilty verdicts when he was paired with Defendant D (AD), who 
had a more serious charge, than when he was in a separate trial of his own (A), 
thereby supporting the third hypothesis. However, the proportion of guilty verdicts 
assigned to defendant A did not differ significantly whether he was paired with 
Defendant B (equal charge) or Defendant D (more serious charge). As such, the 
fourth hypothesis of this study was not supported. The post-hoc analysis showing that 
Defendant A received a significantly higher proportion of guilty verdicts in Condition 
4 (AD) than in Condition 3 (ABC) is consistent with the suggestion that being paired 
with a co-defendant with a more serious charge is disadvantageous. Therefore, two of 
the three comparisons (A & AD and ABC & AD) indicate that having a co-defendant 
with a more serious charge is a disadvantage. However, since the proportion of guilty 
verdicts assigned to Defendant A and confidence ratings in the not-guilty verdicts 
assigned to Defendant A in Conditions 2 (AB) and 4 (AD) were not significantly 
different, one must be cautious in making a conclusion that being paired with a co-
defendant with a more serious charge is disadvantageous. Future research should 
assess the issue of seriousness more fully to be able to make firmer conclusions. 
Limitations of the Present Study 
There are four limitations to this study that are common to some other mock juror 
studies. Firstly, participants in this study are not representative of what a real jury 
would likely consist of. University students served as mock juror participants and 
therefore the results might not be generalisable to what the constitution of a real jury 
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might be. University student verdicts might be different from those of"realjurors". 
While some research has indicated that there is a difference between verdicts by 
university students and verdicts by "real jurors" (e.g., Simon & Mahan, 1971), other 
research shows little or no difference in the two populations' verdicts (e.g., Bray, 
Struckman-Johnson, Osborne, Mcfarlane, & Scott, 1978). Due to a lack of a 
consensus on this issue, one should be cautious in generalising the results of the 
present study to real juror situations. Secondly, there was no group deliberation in 
this study; mock jurors made independent verdicts. Thirdly, the length of the trial 
summary in the present study involved much less information than what a real trial 
would include; jurors would typically have much more complicated matters to 
remember and organise. This limitation is partly due to trial summaries being used 
rather than transcripts of the trial. Therefore, had transcripts been used there would 
have been more information. Fourthly, the mock jurors in the present study were 
aware that their decisions did not have any real consequences, and therefore their 
decisions cannot be assumed to be equal to what they would be if they were actually 
deciding the defendants' futures. 
Directions for Future Research 
Three factors (already discussed) that were absent in this study but could be 
investigated in future research are trial length and complexity, inadmissible evidence, 
and appearance of the defendants together in court. Further, mock jury studies could 
aim to include juror deliberations to increase external validity. Another factor to 
explore is the offence(s) with which the defendants are charged. This study examined 
the effect on a defendant of having a co-defendant charged with an equally serious 
charge or with a more serious charge. It did not examine the effect on a defendant of 
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having a co-defendant with a less serious charge and this could be addressed in future 
research. Further, the offences that the defendants in this study were charged with 
were assault and assault occasioning grievous bodily harm. Other offences and other 
combinations of offences ( e.g., larger difference in seriousness levels, for example 
murder and theft) could be examined. Further, future research could examine 
scenarios with more than three defendants and the effect on all defendants in the trial. 
Conclusions 
In cases where all defendants are charged with the same offence, the results of 
this study indicate that it is not biasing against such defendants to join their trials. 
That is, they are not more likely to receive guilty verdicts in their joint trial compared 
to their separate trials. However, this finding might only hold for cases where there is 
little information for the jury to remember, as was the case in this study. Future 
research should therefore investigate the implications of trial length and complexity, 
inadmissible evidence, and the appearance of defendants in court with co-defendants. 
It appears there might be a bias against defendants, however, in cases where 
they are joined at trial with a co-defendant who is charged with a more serious charge. 
Two of the three scenarios in this study indicated such a bias, whereas the third 
scenario was not consistent with such a bias. A firm conclusion regarding this bias 
cannot therefore be made, though the balance of findings suggest that when judges 
consider applications for trial severance, they should include a consideration of the 
differences in offence severity between defendants as it is possible that a bias may 
ensue if the trials remain joined. 
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APPENDIX A 
PILOT STUDY INFORMATION SHEET 
This study is designed to investigate how potential jurors judge the seriousness 
of a defendant's charge in court. It is the first part of a thesis project conducted by 
Stacy Gall, Masters Student in Forensic Psychology at Edith Cowan University, under 
the supervision of Dr.Alfred Allan. This study conforms to guidelines produced by the 
Edith Cowan University Committee for the Conduct of Ethical Research. Any 
information participants provide will be held in strict confidence by the researcher, 
and nobody else besides herself and her supervisor will have access to such 
information. At no time will names be reported along with responses. The information 
gathered will be used in a thesis and may be used in a scientific publication, however, 
participants will not be identifiable. 
Participating in this study entails reading a transcript of a hypothetical 
criminal trial about an alleged assault and then rating the seriousness of the charges 
against defendants. Total participation time is approximately 30 minutes. You may 
refuse to participate or you may withdraw at any stage without penalty or prejudice 
for doing so. As the trial describes a (nonsexual) assault, if you think that you may 
feel discomfort at hearing about such an incident, you are advised not to participate in 
this study. If you choose to participate at this time, you will be asked to view a 
consent form and indicate your gender and age. The consent form will be kept 
separate from your answers; the answer sheet will not contain any identifying 
information. If you have any questions, please ask the experimenter. 
Any ~ comments concerning this project can be directed to Stacy 
Gall on (08)- or alternatively, to Dr. Alfred Allan on (08) . You 
may keep this Information Sheet. 
APPENDIXB 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM FOR PILOT AND MAIN STUDY 
I confirm that 
• I have read the Information Sheet that was given to me; 
• I was given an opportunity to ask questions; 
• All my questions were satisfactorily answered; 
• I understand this information; 
• No pressure is being put on me to participate; 
• I realise I may withdraw from this study at any time without penalty; and 
• I voluntarily proceed with this study. 
By proceeding with this study, consent is assumed to have been given. This is to 
avoid asking people to sign a consent form showing their names. 
Participant's age: 
Participant's gender: F M (please circle one) 
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APPENDIXC 
PILOT STUDY TRANSCRIPT 
ALL FOUR DEFENDANTS (A, B, C, D) 
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Mr. Steven Adams is charged with unlawful assault, under s. 223 of the WA Criminal 
Code Compilation Act 1913. Mr. Adams pleads not guilty. 
Mr. George Bartlett is charged with unlawful assault, under s. 223 of the WA 
Criminal Code Compilation Act 1913. Mr. Bartlett pleads not guilty. 
Mr. Sean Cole is charged with unlawful assault, under s. 223 of the WA Criminal 
Code Compilation Act 1913. Mr. Cole pleads not guilty. 
Mr. Greg Sutton is charged with grievous bodily harm under s.297 of the WA 
Criminal Code Compilation Act 1913. Mr. Sutton pleads not guilty. 
Mr. Jones, the main prosecution witness, testified that as he was walking down 
Murray Street Mall at dusk on the 14th of June 1998, he was physically assaulted by 
four men from behind. Because he was attacked from behind and had his shirt pulled 
over his head, Mr.Jones stated that he could not identify the assailants but knew that 
they were four men. He testified that he sustained a number of injuries, including 
lacerations to his face and arms, multiple bruises to the face and chest area, three 
cracked ribs and internal bleeding. He also testified that he sustained a concussion as 
a result of one of the defendants smashing his head against the ground several times. 
He was hospitalised for four days after the alleged assault. 
The prosecutor, Mr.Peterson, put forth evidence that placed the four defendants: 
Adams, Bartlett, Cole, and Sutton at the scene of the alleged crime. The prosecution 
witness, Mrs. Wesley, testified that she saw the event and that the four defendants 
were the perpetrators. She also testified that she saw Defendants Adams, Bartlett, and 
Cole punch the alleged victim and saw the Defendant Sutton smash the alleged 
victim's head on the ground several times. In cross-examination, Mr. Everett 
questioned the credibility of an elderly witness who was not wearing her glasses at the 
event she reported. Further, it was pointed out by Mr. Everett that because it was dusk 
at the time of the alleged event, it would have been difficult for any witness to make 
an accurate identification. Despite this, Mrs. Wesley testified that she was certain that 
the men she saw were the four defendants. 
The prosecutor, Mr. Peterson, put forth evidence that placed the defendant Adams' 
car near the scene of the alleged crime. The prosecution witness, Ms Williams, 
testified that she saw a car the same colour and model as the defendant Adams', 
parked along Barrack Street near the scene of the alleged crime on the day in question 
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as she walked from her job at Baskin Robbins ice cream parlour toward the train 
station on Wellington street. In cross-examination by Mr. Davies, who appeared for 
Defendant Adams, it was put forth that although his car was sighted near the alleged 
crime scene, this did not necessarily demonstrate his involvement in the alleged 
cnme. 
The next witness for the prosecution was Mr.Quartermaine, a waiter at the Tea 
Merchant Cafe in the Murray Street Mall. Mr. Quartermaine testified that he 
remembered serving tea and muffins to the Defendant Bartlett in the late afternoon of 
the day in question. In the cross-examination of Mr.Quartermaine, Mr.Everett made it 
clear that although he was sighted near the alleged crime scene, this did not 
necessarily demonstrate the Defendant Bartlett's involvement in the alleged crime. 
The prosecutor, Mr. Peterson, put forth evidence that placed the Defendant Cole near 
the scene of the alleged crime. The prosecution witness, Mr. Wallace, a passerby who 
responded to a police request for public information, testified that he saw the 
Defendant Cole near the alleged crime scene on the date in question. In cross-
examination by Mr.Forsythe, who appeared for Defendant Cole, it was put forward 
that although the Defendant Cole was sighted near the alleged crime scene, this did 
not necessarily demonstrate his involvement in the alleged crime. 
The prosecutor, Mr. Peterson, put forth evidence that placed the Defendant Sutton 
near the scene of the alleged crime. The prosecution witness, Mr. Jenkins owns a 
music store in the Murray Street mall and testified that the security surveillance video 
in his store showed the Defendant Sutton browsing in his store on the date in question. 
In cross-examination by Mr. Tanner who appeared for Defendant Sutton, it was put 
forward that although the Defendant Sutton was sighted near the alleged crime scene 
via the store video, this did not necessarily demonstrate his involvement in the alleged 
cnme. 
The next witness called forth by Mr.Peterson for the prosecution was Sergeant 
Sherman from the Forensics Division of Perth Police Headquarters. Sergeant Sherman 
testified that a muddy shoe print matching the defendant Adams' Adidas shoe was 
found at the scene of the alleged crime. The defence lawyer, Mr. Davies, raised the 
point that Adidas shoes are common and therefore the footprints are not necessarily 
those of the Defendant Adams. Upon questioning, Sergeant Sherman agreed that this 
is possible. 
Mr. Peterson called forth Mr.Bingham, an acquaintance of Defendant Bartlett, as his 
next prosecution witness. Mr. Bingham testified that the pair of sunglasses found at 
the alleged crime scene was similar to a pair he had seen the Defendant Bartlett 
wearing two months previous to the alleged event. Mr.Everett, in cross-examination 
of this witness, uncovered that Mr. Bingham was not certain that the pair of 
sunglasses he had seen the Defendant Bartlett wear two months previous to the 
alleged event, were identical to the ones found at the crime scene. 
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The next witness called forth by Mr. Peterson for the prosecution was Constable 
Sutherland. He testified that a broken keyring containing the same logo as that of the 
Defendant Cole's car was found at the scene of the alleged crime. The defence 
lawyer, Mr. Forsythe raised the point that this brand of car was fairly common and 
therefore the keyring did not necessarily belong to the Defendant Cole. Upon 
questioning, Constable Sutherland agreed that this was possible. 
The next witness called forth by Mr. Peterson for the prosecution was Ms Johnson. 
She testified that the broken 9 ct. gold necklace found at the scene of the alleged 
crime was identical to the one she gave to the defendant Sutton 4 years previous to the 
alleged crime. The defence lawyer, Mr. Tanner raised the point that the necklace was 
a very common style that many people wear and therefore the necklace found at the 
scene of the alleged crime did not necessarily belong to the Defendant Sutton. Ms 
Johnson agreed that it was a possibility. 
Mr. Peterson called forth Senior Constable Smithson as his next prosecution witness. 
Senior Constable Smithson testified that upon Defendant Adams' arrest one day after 
the alleged event, Defendant Adams had a deep purple bruise on his right cheekbone 
which appeared to him to be recently inflicted. Mr. Davies, in cross-examination of 
this witness, proposed to Senior Constable Smithson that the bruise may have been 
inflicted at a time other than the alleged assault, and Senior Constable Smithson 
agreed that this was possible. 
Senior Constable Smithson also testified that when the Defendant Bartlett was 
arrested one day after the alleged event his right hand was bandaged and he was 
vague about how he obtained this injury. Mr. Everett, in cross-examination of this 
witness, proposed to Senior Constable Smithson that the injury to the Defendant 
Bartlett's hand might have been inflicted at a time other than the alleged assault, and 
Senior Constable Smithson agreed that this was possible. 
Senior Constable Smithson further testified that upon the Defendant Cole's arrest one 
day after the alleged event, Defendant Cole was walking with a slight limp. Mr. 
Forsythe, in cross examination of this witness, proposed to Senior Constable 
Smithson that this limp might not be the result of the alleged assault. Senior Constable 
Smithson agreed that this was possible. 
Senior Constable Smithson further testified that upon the Defendant Sutton's arrest 
one day after the alleged event, Defendant Sutton's gums were bleeding and one of 
his teeth was Chipped. Mr. Tanner, in cross examination, proposed to Senior 
Constable Smithson that the Chipped tooth and bleeding gums may not be the result 
of the alleged assault. Senior Constable Smithson agreed that this was possible. 
In Defendant Adams' defence, Mr. Davies called Defendant Adams' partner, Ms 
Simone Waters. She testified that on the date in question, Defendant Adams was with 
her. She reported that they parked the car along Barrack Street in the city that 
morning at approximately 1 Oam, and then walked to the Swan River foreshore to have 
a picnic. She further testified that they returned to the car at approximately 6.30 pm 
on the date in question, and then went home. In addition, Ms Waters testified that she 
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was responsible for the Defendant Adams' bruise the day before the alleged event 
when she was intoxicated and became quite aggressive. In cross-examination, Mr. 
Peterson, elicited from Ms Waters that she had been drinking whiskey quite heavily 
from noon on the date in question. Upon further questioning it emerged that Ms 
Waters was a chronic alcoholic, who drank at least one bottle of whiskey daily. The 
defence objected to this line of questioning, however, the judge overruled this, stating 
that the evidence was relevant to evaluate the credibility of the witness. Mr. Peterson 
suggested that Ms Waters' capacity to give evidence was questionable, as she was 
intoxicated not only on the date in question, but the surrounding days also. Mr. 
Peterson then proposed that there was the possibility that Defendant Adams may have 
left her for a short time and met up with the other three alleged assailants while she 
lay intoxicated in the park. Although she stated that she could not remember the exact 
events of the date in question, Ms Waters was sure that Defendant Adams was with 
her at all times. 
In the Defendant Bartlett's defence, Mr.Everett called the Defendant Bartlett's father, 
Mr.Frank Bartlett. He testified that on the date in question, the defendant Bartlett 
arrived home at approximately 2:00 on the afternoon in question and to his knowledge 
did not leave the house until the following morning. Mr. Frank Bartlett further 
testified that his son had told him that the injury to his hand was the result of his 
involvement in rugby. In cross-examination by the prosecutor Mr.Peterson, it 
emerged that on the day in question, Mr.Frank Bartlett was bedridden with glandular 
fever and could not be certain that the Defendant Bartlett did not leave the house later 
on that afternoon while he had been sleeping. Despite this, Mr.Frank Bartlett was 
certain that he would have heard the Defendant Bartlett leave the house. Further, Mr. 
Frank Bartlett could not verify that his son had actually received the injury to his hand 
by playing rugby as he was not himself present at the game. 
In Defendant Cole's defence, Mr. Forsythe called the Defendant Cole's employer, Mr. 
Edwards to testify. He testified that on the date in question, Defendant Cole was 
working at his clothing shop on Hay Street although he himself was not present that 
day. He reported that the Defendant Cole commenced work at approximately 9:00 am 
and finished at 7:00pm as it was a late-night shopping day. In addition, he testified 
that when he next saw the Defendant Cole, he had a limp which he attributed to a 
bicycle accident. In Mr. Peterson's cross-examination of Mr. Edwards, it became 
apparent that Mr. Edwards could not guarantee that the Defendant Cole had not left 
the shop at any point on the day in question. Furthermore, he also could not verify 
Defendant Cole's involvement in a bicycle accident as he had only been told this by 
Defendant Cole. 
In Defendant Sutton's defence, Mr. Tanner called the Defendant Sutton's 
grandmother, Mrs. Roberts to testify. She testified that on the day in question, the 
Defendant Sutton arrived at her house at approximately 10:00 in the morning to help 
her look after her grandson, aged one and a half, for the majority of the day. At about 
4pm Mrs. Roberts testified that she realised the infant would soon be ready to take a 
nap so she told the Defendant Sutton to put the infant in his crib when he falls asleep, 
and then she went off for a nap herself. She testified that when she woke up at 7:00pm 
the Defendant Sutton was still there. By that time his gums were bleeding and one of 
his teeth was Chipped. Upon questioning him about the tooth, Mrs.Roberts testified 
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that the Defendant Sutton told her that he was lying on the floor watching tv when the 
infant crawled over to him with a glass in his hand and dropped it on his face, 
consequently breaking his tooth off and causing his gums to bleed. In cross 
examination by the prosecutor Mr.Peterson, it was put to Mrs.Roberts that because 
she had been sleeping for part of the day in question, it was possible that the 
Defendant Sutton had actually left her house and committed the alleged crime. 
Further, because she had not actually seen the infant drop the glass on the Defendant 
Sutton's face, she could not be certain that this had actually caused the injury. 
Mrs.Roberts accepted that this was a possibility but was still sure that the Defendant 
Sutton had not actually left the house until later that evening and had sustained the 
injury from the infant as he was an active little boy. 
In summarising the prosecution's case against the Defendant Adams, Mr. Peterson 
stated that the sighting of Defendant Adams at the scene and his car near the scene of 
the alleged crime as well as his facial bruising and the footprint matching his brand of 
shoe, implied his involvement in the alleged event. He further stated that the alibi 
provided by Ms Waters was questionable, due to possible impairments stemming 
from her alcohol problem. 
In summarising the prosecution's case against the Defendant Bartlett, Mr. Peterson 
stated that the sighting of the Defendant Bartlett near the scene and at the scene of the 
alleged event on the day in question, the injury to his hand, and sunglasses similar to 
those previously worn by the Defendant Bartlett found at the scene of the alleged 
crime implied his involvement in the alleged event. He further stated that the alibi 
provided by Mr.Frank Bartlett was questionable as he had a serious illness which 
resulted in his being bedridden and asleep much of the day. 
In summarising the prosecution's case against the Defendant Cole, Mr. Peterson 
stated that the sighting of the Defendant Cole near and at the scene of the alleged 
event on the day in question, as well as the broken keyring and his limp, implied his 
involvement in the alleged crime. He further stated that the alibi provided by 
Mr.Edwards was questionable due to the fact that he was actually not working that 
day and the Defendant Cole was the only worker at the shop. 
In summarising the prosecution's case against the Defendant Sutton, Peterson stated 
that the sighting of the Defendant Sutton near the scene and at the scene of the alleged 
crime on the day in question, the injury to his tooth and gums, and a necklace similar 
to that previously worn by the Defendant Sutton found at the scene of the alleged 
crime implied his involvement in the alleged event. He further stated that the alibi 
provided by Mrs. Roberts was questionable as she had been sleeping for part of the 
day. 
In summarising the case for the defence of the Defendant Adams, Mr. Davies put 
forth that the evidence by the elderly Mrs. Wesley was questionable and the other 
items of evidence did not necessarily prove that the Defendant Adams had any 
involvement in the alleged offence. 
In summarising the case for the defence of the Defendant Bartlett, Mr. Everett put 
forth that the evidence presented by the elderly Mrs. Wesley was questionable and the 
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other items of evidence did not necessarily prove that the Defendant Bartlett had any 
involvement in the alleged offence. 
In summarising the case for the defence of the Defendant Cole, Mr. Forsythe put forth 
that the testimony of the elderly Mrs. Wesley was questionable and that the remaining 
items of the evidence did not prove the Defendant Cole's involvement in the alleged 
offence. 
In summarising the case for the defence of the Defendant Sutton, Mr. Tanner put forth 
that the evidence presented by the elderly Mrs. Wesley was questionable and the other 
items of evidence did not necessarily prove that the Defendant Sutton had any 
involvement in the alleged offence. 
The judge then explained to the jury that they must consider the case of each 
Defendant separately and that they are to reach independent verdicts for each of the 
four defendants. The judge further instructed that they must only find a defendant 
guilty if the evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that he was involved in its 
comm1ss1on. 
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APPENDIXD 
PILOT STUDY RESPONSE SHEET 
Please rate how serious you find the charge against each of the defendants 
by circling the appropriate number on the scale. 
Steven Adams, on the charge of assault: 
Not very serious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very serious 
George Bartlett, on the charge of assault: 
Not very serious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very serious 
Sean Cole, on the charge of assault: 
Not very serious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very serious 
Greg Sutton, on the charge of grievous bodily harm: 
Not very serious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very serious 
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APPENDIXE 
MAIN STUDY INFORMATION SHEET 
This study is designed to investigate jurors' decision-making processes. This 
study is being conducted by Stacy Gall, Masters student in Forensic Psychology at 
Edith Cowan University, under the supervision of Dr. Alfred Allan. This study 
conforms to guidelines produced by the Edith Cowan University Committee for the 
Conduct of Ethical Research. Any information participants provide will be held in 
strict confidence by the researcher, and nobody else besides herself and her supervisor 
will have access to such information. At no time will names be reported along with 
responses. The information gathered will be used in a thesis and may be used in a 
scientific publication, however, participants will not be identifiable. 
Participating in this study entails listening to an audiotape of a hypothetical 
criminal trial about an alleged assault and then giving a verdict of either "guilty" or 
"not-guilty". Total participation time is approximately 25 minutes. You may refuse to 
participate or you may withdraw at any stage without penalty or prejudice for doing 
so. As the trial describes a (nonsexual) assault, if you think that you may feel 
discomfort at hearing about such an incident, you are advised not to participate in this 
study. If you choose to participate at this time, you will be asked to view the consent 
form. The answer sheet will not contain any identifying information. If you have any 
questions, please ask the experimenter. 
Any ~ comments concerning this project can be directed to Stacy 
Gall on (08)-or alternatively, to Dr. Alfred Allan on (08)-You 
may keep this Information Sheet. 
APPENDIXF 
AUDI OT APE TRANSCRIPT FOR CONDITION 1 OF MAIN STUDY 
DEFENDANT A ONLY 
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Mr. Steven Adams is charged with unlawful assault, under s. 223 of the WA Criminal 
Code Compilation Act 1913. Mr. Adams pleads not guilty. 
Mr. Jones, the main prosecution witness and victim in the alleffied crime, testified that 
as he was walking down Murray Street Mall at dusk on the 14t of June 1998, he was 
physically assaulted from behind. Because he was attacked from behind and was 
extremely distressed, Mr.Jones stated that he could not identify the assailants but 
knew that they were four men. He testified that he sustained a number of injuries from 
three of the four men, including lacerations to his face and arms, and multiple bruises 
to the face and chest area. 
The prosecutor, Mr.Peterson, put forth evidence that placed the defendant Adams at 
the scene of the alleged crime. The prosecution witness, Mrs. Wesley, testified that 
she saw the event and that the defendant was one of the perpetrators. She also 
testified that she saw Defendant Adams punch the alleged victim. In cross-
examination, Mr. Everett questioned the credibility of an elderly witness who was not 
wearing her glasses at the event she reported. Further, it was pointed out by Mr. 
Everett that because it was dusk at the time of the alleged event, it would have been 
difficult for any witness to make an accurate identification. Despite this, Mrs. Wesley 
testified that she was certain that the men she saw included the defendant. 
The prosecutor, Mr. Peterson, put forth evidence that placed the defendant Adams' 
car near the scene of the alleged crime. The prosecution witness, Ms Williams, 
testified that she saw a car the same colour and model as the defendant Adams', 
parked along Barrack Street near the scene of the alleged crime on the day in question 
as she walked from her job at Baskin Robbins ice cream parlour toward the train 
station on Wellington street. In cross-examination by Mr. Davies, who appeared for 
Defendant Adams, it was put forth that although his car was sighted near the alleged 
crime scene, this did not necessarily demonstrate his involvement in the alleged 
cnme. 
The next witness called forth by Mr.Peterson for the prosecution was Sergeant 
Sherman from the Forensics Division of Perth Police Headquarters. Sergeant Sherman 
testified that a muddy shoe print matching the defendant Adams' Adidas shoe was 
found at the scene of the alleged crime. The defence lawyer, Mr. Davies, raised the 
point that Adidas shoes are common and therefore the footprints are not necessarily 
those of the Defendant Adams. Upon questioning, Sergeant Sherman agreed that this 
is possible. 
Mr. Peterson called forth Senior Constable Smithson as his next prosecution witness. 
Senior Constable Smithson testified that upon Defendant Adams' arrest one day after 
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the alleged event, Defendant Adams had a deep purple bruise on his right cheekbone 
which appeared to him to be recently inflicted. Mr. Davies, in cross-examination of 
this witness, proposed to Senior Constable Smithson that the bruise may have been 
inflicted at a time other than the alleged assault, and Senior Constable Smithson 
agreed that this was possible. 
In Defendant Adams' defence, Mr. Davies called Defendant Adams' partner, Ms 
Simone Waters. She testified that on the date in question, Defendant Adams was with 
her. She reported that they parked the car along Barrack Street in the city that 
morning at approximately 1 Oam, and then walked to the Swan River foreshore to have 
a picnic. She further testified that they returned to the car at approximately 6.30 pm 
on the date in question, and then went home. In addition, Ms Waters testified that she 
was responsible for the Defendant Adams' bruise the day before the alleged event 
when she was intoxicated and became quite aggressive. In cross-examination, Mr. 
Peterson, elicited from Ms Waters that she had been drinking whiskey quite heavily 
from noon on the date in question. Upon further questioning it emerged that Ms 
Waters was a chronic alcoholic, who drank at least one bottle of whiskey daily. The 
defence objected to this line of questioning, however, the judge overruled this, stating 
that the evidence was relevant to evaluate the credibility of the witness. Mr. Peterson 
suggested that Ms Waters' capacity to give evidence was questionable, as she was 
intoxicated not only on the date in question, but the surrounding days also. Mr. 
Peterson then proposed that there was the possibility that Defendant Adams may have 
left her for a short time and met up with the other three alleged assailants while she 
lay intoxicated in the park. Although she stated that she could not remember the exact 
events of the date in question, Ms Waters was sure that Defendant Adams was with 
her at all times. 
In summarising the prosecution's case against the Defendant Adams, Mr. Peterson 
stated that the sighting of Defendant Adams at the scene and his car near the scene of 
the alleged crime as well as his facial bruising and the footprint matching his brand of 
shoe, implied his involvement in the alleged event. He further stated that the alibi 
provided by Ms Waters was questionable, due to possible impairments stemming 
from her alcohol problem. 
In summarising the case for the defence of the Defendant Adams, Mr. Davies put 
forth that the evidence by the elderly Mrs.Wesley was questionable and the other 
items of evidence did not necessarily prove that the Defendant Adams had any 
involvement in the alleged offence. 
The judge then explained to the jury that they must consider the case of the Defendant 
and that they must only find the defendant guilty if the evidence proves beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
APPENDIXG 
AUDIOTAPE TRANSCRIPT FOR CONDITION 2 OF MAIN STUDY 
DEFENDANTS A AND B 
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Mr. Steven Adams is charged with unlawful assault, under s. 223 of the WA Criminal 
Code Compilation Act 1913. Mr. Adams pleads not guilty. 
Mr. George Bartlett is charged with unlawful assault, under s. 223 of the WA 
Criminal Code Compilation Act 1913. Mr. Bartlett pleads not guilty. 
Mr. Jones, the main prosecution witness and victim in the alle~ed crime, testified that 
as he was walking down Murray Street Mall at dusk on the 14 of June 1998, he was 
physically assaulted from behind. Because he was attacked from behind and was 
extremely distressed, Mr.Jones stated that he could not identify the assailants but 
knew that they were four men. He testified that he sustained a number of injuries from 
three of the four men, including lacerations to his face and arms, and multiple bruises 
to the face and chest area. 
The prosecutor, Mr.Peterson, put forth evidence that placed the two defendants 
Adams and Bartlett at the scene of the alleged crime. The prosecution witness, Mrs. 
Wesley, testified that she saw the event and that the two defendants were the 
perpetrators. She also testified that she saw Defendants Adams and Bartlett punch the 
alleged victim. In cross-examination, Mr. Everett questioned the credibility of an 
elderly witness who was not wearing her glasses at the event she reported. Further, it 
was pointed out by Mr. Everett that because it was dusk at the time of the alleged 
event, it would have been difficult for any witness to make an accurate identification. 
Despite this, Mrs. Wesley testified that she was certain that two of the men she saw 
were the two defendants. 
The prosecutor, Mr. Peterson, put forth evidence that placed the defendant Adams' 
car near the scene of the alleged crime. The prosecution witness, Ms Williams, 
testified that she saw a car the same colour and model as the defendant Adams', 
parked along Barrack Street near the scene of the alleged crime on the day in question 
as she walked from her job at Baskin Robbins ice cream parlour toward the train 
station on Wellington street. In cross-examination by Mr. Davies, who appeared for 
Defendant Adams, it was put forth that although his car was sighted near the alleged 
crime scene, this did not necessarily demonstrate his involvement in the alleged 
crime. 
The next witness for the prosecution was Mr.Quartermaine, a waiter at the Tea 
Merchant Cafe in the Murray Street Mall. Mr. Quartermaine testified that he 
remembered serving tea and muffins to the Defendant Bartlett in the late afternoon of 
the day in question. In the cross-examination of Mr.Quartermaine, Mr.Everett made it 
clear that although he was sighted near the alleged crime scene, this did not 
necessarily demonstrate the Defendant Bartlett's involvement in the alleged crime. 
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The next witness called forth by Mr.Peterson for the prosecution was Sergeant 
Sherman from the Forensics Division of Perth Police Headquarters. Sergeant Sherman 
testified that a muddy shoe print matching the defendant Adams' Adidas shoe was 
found at the scene of the alleged crime. The defence lawyer, Mr. Davies, raised the 
point that Adidas shoes are common and therefore the footprints are not necessarily 
those of the Defendant Adams. Upon questioning, Sergeant Sherman agreed that this 
is possible. 
Mr. Peterson called forth Mr.Bingham, an acquaintance of Defendant Bartlett, as his 
next prosecution witness. Mr. Bingham testified that the pair of sunglasses found at 
the alleged crime scene was similar to a pair he had seen the Defendant Bartlett 
wearing two months previous to the alleged event. Mr.Everett, in cross-examination 
of this witness, uncovered that Mr. Bingham was not certain that the pair of 
sunglasses he had seen the Defendant Bartlett wear two months previous to the 
alleged event, were identical to the ones found at the crime scene. 
Mr. Peterson called forth Senior Constable Smithson as his next prosecution witness. 
Senior Constable Smithson testified that upon Defendant Adams' arrest one day after 
the alleged event, Defendant Adams had a deep purple bruise on his right cheekbone 
which appeared to him to be recently inflicted. Mr. Davies, in cross-examination of 
this witness, proposed to Senior Constable Smithson that the bruise may have been 
inflicted at a time other than the alleged assault, and Senior Constable Smithson 
agreed that this was possible. 
Senior Constable Smithson also testified that when the Defendant Bartlett was 
arrested one day after the alleged event his right hand was bandaged and he was 
vague about how he obtained this injury. Mr. Everett, in cross-examination of this 
witness, proposed to Senior Constable Smithson that the injury to the Defendant 
Bartlett's hand might have been inflicted at a time other than the alleged assault, and 
Senior Constable Smithson agreed that this was possible. 
In Defendant Adams' defence, Mr. Davies called Defendant Adams' partner, Ms 
Simone Waters. She testified that on the date in question, Defendant Adams was with 
her. She reported that they parked the car along Barrack Street in the city that 
morning at approximately 1 Oam, and then walked to the Swan River foreshore to have 
a picnic. She further testified that they returned to the car at approximately 6.30 pm 
on the date in question, and then went home. In addition, Ms Waters testified that she 
was responsible for the Defendant Adams' bruise the day before the alleged event 
when she was intoxicated and became quite aggressive. In cross-examination, Mr. 
Peterson, elicited from Ms Waters that she had been drinking whiskey quite heavily 
from noon on the date in question. Upon further questioning it emerged that Ms 
Waters was a chronic alcoholic, who drank at least one bottle of whiskey daily. The 
defence objected to this line of questioning, however, the judge overruled this, stating 
that the evidence was relevant to evaluate the credibility of the witness. Mr. Peterson 
suggested that Ms Waters' capacity to give evidence was questionable, as she was 
intoxicated not only on the date in question, but the surrounding days also. Mr. 
Peterson then proposed that there was the possibility that Defendant Adams may have 
left her for a short time and met up with the other three alleged assailants while she 
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lay intoxicated in the park. Although she stated that she could not remember the exact 
events of the date in question, Ms Waters was sure that Defendant Adams was with 
her at all times. 
In the Defendant Bartlett's defence, Mr.Everett called the Defendant Bartlett's father, 
Mr.Frank Bartlett. He testified that on the date in question, the defendant Bartlett 
arrived home at approximately 2:00 on the afternoon in question and to his knowledge 
did not leave the house until the following morning. Mr. Frank Bartlett further 
testified that his son had told him that the injury to his hand was the result of his 
involvement in rugby. In cross-examination by the prosecutor Mr.Peterson, it 
emerged that on the day in question, Mr.Frank Bartlett was bedridden with glandular 
fever and could not be certain that the Defendant Bartlett did not leave the house later 
on that afternoon while he had been sleeping. Despite this, Mr.Frank Bartlett was 
certain that he would have heard the Defendant Bartlett leave the house. Further, Mr. 
Frank Bartlett could not verify that his son had actually received the injury to his hand 
by playing rugby as he was not himself present at the game. 
In summarising the prosecution's case against the Defendant Adams, Mr. Peterson 
stated that the sighting of Defendant Adams at the scene and his car near the scene of 
the alleged crime as well as his facial bruising and the footprint matching his brand of 
shoe, implied his involvement in the alleged event. He further stated that the alibi 
provided by Ms Waters was questionable, due to possible impairments stemming 
from her alcohol problem. 
In summarising the prosecution's case against the Defendant Bartlett, Mr. Peterson 
stated that the sighting of the Defendant Bartlett near the scene and at the scene of the 
alleged event on the day in question, the injury to his hand, and sunglasses similar to 
those previously worn by the Defendant Bartlett found at the scene of the alleged 
crime implied his involvement in the alleged event. He further stated that the alibi 
provided by Mr.Frank Bartlett was questionable as he had a serious illness which 
resulted in his being bedridden and asleep much of the day. 
In summarising the case for the defence of the Defendant Adams, Mr. Davies put 
forth that the evidence by the elderly Mrs.Wesley was questionable and the other 
items of evidence did not necessarily prove that the Defendant Adams had any 
involvement in the alleged offence. 
In summarising the case for the defence of the Defendant Bartlett, Mr. Everett put 
forth that the evidence presented by the elderly Mrs. Wesley was questionable and the 
other items of evidence did not necessarily prove that the Defendant Bartlett had any 
involvement in the alleged offence. 
The judge then explained to the jury that they must consider the case of each 
Defendant separately and that they are to reach independent verdicts for each of the 
two defendants. The judge further instructed that they must only find a defendant 
guilty if the evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt. 
APPENDIXH 
AUDIOTAPE TRANSCRIPT FOR CONDITION 3 OF MAIN STUDY 
DEFENDANTS A, B, C 
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Mr. Steven Adams is charged with unlawful assault, under s. 223 of the WA Criminal 
Code Compilation Act 1913. Mr. Adams pleads not guilty. 
Mr. George Bartlett is charged with unlawful assault, under s. 223 of the WA 
Criminal Code Compilation Act 1913. Mr. Bartlett pleads not guilty. 
Mr. Sean Cole is charged with unlawful assault, under s. 223 of the WA Criminal 
Code Compilation Act 1913. Mr. Cole pleads not guilty. 
Mr. Jones, the main prosecution witness and victim in the alleged crime, testified that 
as he was walking down Murray Street Mall at dusk on the 14 t of June 1998, he was 
physically assaulted from behind. Because he was attacked from behind and was 
extremely distressed, Mr.Jones stated that he could not identify the assailants but 
knew that they were four men. He testified that he sustained a number of injuries from 
three of the four men, including lacerations to his face and arms, and multiple bruises 
to the face and chest area. 
The prosecutor, Mr.Peterson, put forth evidence that placed the three defendants: 
Adams, Bartlett, and Cole at the scene of the alleged crime. The prosecution witness, 
Mrs. Wesley, testified that she saw the event and that the three defendants were the 
perpetrators. She also testified that she saw Defendants Adams, Bartlett, and Cole 
punch the alleged victim. In cross-examination, Mr. Everett questioned the credibility 
of an elderly witness who was not wearing her glasses at the event she reported. 
Further, it was pointed out by Mr. Everett that because it was dusk at the time of the 
alleged event, it would have been difficult for any witness to make an accurate 
identification. Despite this, Mrs. Wesley testified that she was certain that the men she 
saw were the three defendants. 
The prosecutor, Mr. Peterson, put forth evidence that placed the defendant Adams' 
car near the scene of the alleged crime. The prosecution witness, Ms Williams, 
testified that she saw a car the same colour and model as the defendant Adams', 
parked along Barrack Street near the scene of the alleged crime on the day in question 
as she walked from her job at Baskin Robbins ice cream parlour toward the train 
station on Wellington street. In cross-examination by Mr. Davies, who appeared for 
Defendant Adams, it was put forth that although his car was sighted near the alleged 
crime scene, this did not necessarily demonstrate his involvement in the alleged 
cnme. 
The next witness for the prosecution was Mr.Quartermaine, a waiter at the Tea 
Merchant Cafe in the Murray Street Mall. Mr. Quartermaine testified that he 
remembered serving tea and muffins to the Defendant Bartlett in the late afternoon of 
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the day in question. In the cross-examination ofMr.Quartermaine, Mr.Everett made it 
clear that although he was sighted near the alleged crime scene, this did not 
necessarily demonstrate the Defendant Bartlett's involvement in the alleged crime. 
The prosecutor, Mr. Peterson, put forth evidence that placed the Defendant Cole near 
the scene of the alleged crime. The prosecution witness, Mr. Wallace, a passerby who 
responded to a police request for public information, testified that he saw the 
Defendant Cole near the alleged crime scene on the date in question. In cross-
examination by Mr.Forsythe, who appeared for Defendant Cole, it was put forward 
that although the Defendant Cole was sighted near the alleged crime scene, this did 
not necessarily demonstrate his involvement in the alleged crime. 
The next witness called forth by Mr.Peterson for the prosecution was Sergeant 
Sherman from the Forensics Division of Perth Police Headquarters. Sergeant Sherman 
testified that a muddy shoe print matching the defendant Adams' Adidas shoe was 
found at the scene of the alleged crime. The defence lawyer, Mr. Davies, raised the 
point that Adidas shoes are common and therefore the footprints are not necessarily 
those of the Defendant Adams. Upon questioning, Sergeant Sherman agreed that this 
is possible. 
Mr. Peterson called forth Mr.Bingham, an acquaintance of Defendant Bartlett, as his 
next prosecution witness. Mr. Bingham testified that the pair of sunglasses found at 
the alleged crime scene was similar to a pair he had seen the Defendant Bartlett 
wearing two months previous to the alleged event. Mr.Everett, in cross-examination 
of this witness, uncovered that Mr. Bingham was not certain that the pair of 
sunglasses he had seen the Defendant Bartlett wear two months previous to the 
alleged event, were identical to the ones found at the crime scene. 
The next witness called forth by Mr. Peterson for the prosecution was Constable 
Sutherland. He testified that a broken keyring containing the same logo as that of the 
Defendant Cole's car was found at the scene of the alleged crime. The defence 
lawyer, Mr. Forsythe raised the point that this brand of car was fairly common and 
therefore the keyring did not necessarily belong to the Defendant Cole. Upon 
questioning, Constable Sutherland agreed that this was possible. 
Mr. Peterson called forth Senior Constable Smithson as his next prosecution witness. 
Senior Constable Smithson testified that upon Defendant Adams' arrest one day after 
the alleged event, Defendant Adams had a deep purple bruise on his right cheekbone 
which appeared to him to be recently inflicted. Mr. Davies, in cross-examination of 
this witness, proposed to Senior Constable Smithson that the bruise may have been 
inflicted at a time other than the alleged assault, and Senior Constable Smithson 
agreed that this was possible. 
Senior Constable Smithson also testified that when the Defendant Bartlett was 
arrested one day after the alleged event his right hand was bandaged and he was 
vague about how he obtained this injury. Mr. Everett, in cross-examination of this 
witness, proposed to Senior Constable Smithson that the injury to the Defendant 
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Bartlett's hand might have been inflicted at a time other than the alleged assault, and 
Senior Constable Smithson agreed that this was possible. 
Senior Constable Smithson further testified that upon the Defendant Cole's arrest one 
day after the alleged event, Defendant Cole was walking with a slight limp. Mr. 
Forsythe, in cross examination of this witness, proposed to Senior Constable 
Smithson that this limp might not be the result of the alleged assault. Senior Constable 
Smithson agreed that this was possible. 
In Defendant Adams' defence, Mr. Davies called Defendant Adams' partner, Ms 
Simone Waters. She testified that on the date in question, Defendant Adams was with 
her. She reported that they parked the car along Barrack Street in the city that 
morning at approximately 1 Oam, and then walked to the Swan River foreshore to have 
a picnic. She further testified that they returned to the car at approximately 6.30 pm 
on the date in question, and then went home. In addition, Ms Waters testified that she 
was responsible for the Defendant Adams' bruise the day before the alleged event 
when she was intoxicated and became quite aggressive. In cross-examination, Mr. 
Peterson, elicited from Ms Waters that she had been drinking whiskey quite heavily 
from noon on the date in question. Upon further questioning it emerged that Ms 
Waters was a chronic alcoholic, who drank at least one bottle of whiskey daily. The 
defence objected to this line of questioning, however, the judge overruled this, stating 
that the evidence was relevant to evaluate the credibility of the witness. Mr. Peterson 
suggested that Ms Waters' capacity to give evidence was questionable, as she was 
intoxicated not only on the date in question, but the surrounding days also. Mr. 
Peterson then proposed that there was the possibility that Defendant Adams may have 
left her for a short time and met up with the other three alleged assailants while she 
lay intoxicated in the park. Although she stated that she could not remember the exact 
events of the date in question, Ms Waters was sure that Defendant Adams was with 
her at all times. 
In the Defendant Bartlett's defence, Mr.Everett called the Defendant Bartlett's father, 
Mr.Frank Bartlett. He testified that on the date in question, the defendant Bartlett 
arrived home at approximately 2:00 on the afternoon in question and to his knowledge 
did not leave the house until the following morning. Mr. Frank Bartlett further 
testified that his son had told him that the injury to his hand was the result of his 
involvement in rugby. In cross-examination by the prosecutor Mr.Peterson, it 
emerged that on the day in question, Mr.Frank Bartlett was bedridden with glandular 
fever and could not be certain that the Defendant Bartlett did not leave the house later 
on that afternoon while he had been sleeping. Despite this, Mr.Frank Bartlett was 
certain that he would have heard the Defendant Bartlett leave the house. Further, Mr. 
Frank Bartlett could not verify that his son had actually received the injury to his hand 
by playing rugby as he was not himself present at the game. 
In Defendant Cole's defence, Mr. Forsythe called the Defendant Cole's employer, Mr. 
Edwards to testify. He testified that on the date in question, Defendant Cole was 
working at his clothing shop on Hay Street although he himself was not present that 
day. He reported that the Defendant Cole commenced work at approximately 9:00 am 
and finished at 7:00pm as it was a late-night shopping day. In addition, he testified 
that when he next saw the Defendant Cole, he had a limp which he attributed to a 
bicycle accident. In Mr. Peterson's cross-examination of Mr. Edwards, it became 
apparent that Mr. Edwards could not guarantee that the Defendant Cole had not left 
the shop at any point on the day in question. Furthermore, he also could not verify 
Defendant Cole's involvement in a bicycle accident as he had only been told this by 
Defendant Cole. 
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In summarising the prosecution's case against the Defendant Adams, Mr. Peterson 
stated that the sighting of Defendant Adams at the scene and his car near the scene of 
the alleged crime as well as his facial bruising and the footprint matching his brand of 
shoe, implied his involvement in the alleged event. He further stated that the alibi 
provided by Ms Waters was questionable, due to possible impairments stemming 
from her alcohol problem. 
In summarising the prosecution's case against the Defendant Bartlett, Mr. Peterson 
stated that the sighting of the Defendant Bartlett near the scene and at the scene of the 
alleged event on the day in question, the injury to his hand, and sunglasses similar to 
those previously worn by the Defendant Bartlett found at the scene of the alleged 
crime implied his involvement in the alleged event. He further stated that the alibi 
provided by Mr.Frank Bartlett was questionable as he had a serious illness which 
resulted in his being bedridden and asleep much of the day. 
In summarising the prosecution's case against the Defendant Cole, Mr. Peterson 
stated that the sighting of the Defendant Cole near and at the scene of the alleged 
event on the day in question, as well as the broken keyring and his limp, implied his 
involvement in the alleged crime. He further stated that the alibi provided by 
Mr.Edwards was questionable due to the fact that he was actually not working that 
day and the Defendant Cole was the only worker at the shop. 
In summarising the case for the defence of the Defendant Adams, Mr. Davies put 
forth that the evidence by the elderly Mrs. Wesley was questionable and the other 
items of evidence did not necessarily prove that the Defendant Adams had any 
involvement in the alleged offence. 
In summarising the case for the defence of the Defendant Bartlett, Mr. Everett put 
forth that the evidence presented by the elderly Mrs. Wesley was questionable and the 
other items of evidence did not necessarily prove that the Defendant Bartlett had any 
involvement in the alleged offence. 
In summarising the case for the defence of the Defendant Cole, Mr. Forsythe put forth 
that the testimony of the elderly Mrs. Wesley was questionable and that the remaining 
items of the evidence did not prove the Defendant Cole's involvement in the alleged 
offence. 
The judge then explained to the jury that they must consider the case of each 
Defendant separately and that they are to reach independent verdicts for each of the 
three defendants. The judge further instructed that they must only find a defendant 
guilty if the evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt. 
APPENDIX I 
AUDIOTAPE TRANSCRIPT FOR CONDITION 4 OF MAIN STUDY 
DEFENDANTS A AND D 
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Mr. Steven Adams is charged with unlawful assault, under s. 223 of the WA Criminal 
Code Compilation Act 1913. Mr. Adams pleads not guilty. 
Mr. Greg Sutton is charged with grievous bodily harm under s.297 of the WA 
Criminal Code Compilation Act 1913. Mr. Sutton pleads not guilty. 
Mr. Jones, the main prosecution witness and victim in the alle~ed crime, testified that 
as he was walking down Murray Street Mall at dusk on the 14t of June 1998, he was 
physically assaulted by four men from behind. Because he was attacked from behind 
and was extremely distressed, Mr.Jones stated that he could not identify the assailants 
but knew that they were four men. He testified that he sustained a number of injuries 
from three of the four men, allegedly including Defendant Adams, including 
lacerations to his face and arms, and multiple bruises to the face and chest area. He 
also testified that from the fourth man, allegedly Defendant Sutton, he sustained 
severe injuries including three cracked ribs, internal bleeding, and a concussion as a 
result of the fourth defendant smashing his head against the ground and jumping on 
his torso numerous times. He was hospitalised for four days after the alleged assault. 
The prosecutor, Mr.Peterson, put forth evidence that placed the two defendants 
Adams and Sutton at the scene of the alleged crime. The prosecution witness, Mrs. 
Wesley, testified that she saw the event and that the two defendants were two of the 
perpetrators. She also testified that she saw Defendant Adams punch the alleged 
victim and saw the Defendant Sutton smash the alleged victim's head on the ground 
and jump on his body several times. In cross-examination, Mr. Everett questioned the 
credibility of an elderly witness who was not wearing her glasses at the event she 
reported. Further, it was pointed out by Mr. Everett that because it was dusk at the 
time of the alleged event, it would have been difficult for any witness to make an 
accurate identification. Despite this, Mrs. Wesley testified that she was certain that the 
men she saw were the two defendants. 
The prosecutor, Mr. Peterson, put forth evidence that placed the defendant Adams' 
car near the scene of the alleged crime. The prosecution witness, Ms Williams, 
testified that she saw a car the same colour and model as the defendant Adams', 
parked along Barrack Street near the scene of the alleged crime on the day in question 
as she walked from her job at Baskin Robbins ice cream parlour toward the train 
station on Wellington street. In cross-examination by Mr. Davies, who appeared for 
Defendant Adams, it was put forth that although his car was sighted near the alleged 
crime scene, this did not necessarily demonstrate his involvement in the alleged 
crime. 
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The prosecutor, Mr. Peterson, put forth evidence that placed the Defendant Sutton 
near the scene of the alleged crime. The prosecution witness, Mr. Jenkins owns a 
music store in the Murray Street mall and testified that the security surveillance video 
in his store showed the Defendant Sutton browsing in his store on the date in question. 
In cross-examination by Mr. Tanner who appeared for Defendant Sutton, it was put 
forward that although the Defendant Sutton was sighted near the alleged crime scene 
via the store video, this did not necessarily demonstrate his involvement in the alleged 
cnme. 
The next witness called forth by Mr.Peterson for the prosecution was Sergeant 
Sherman from the Forensics Division of Perth Police Headquarters. Sergeant Sherman 
testified that a muddy shoe print matching the defendant Adams' Adidas shoe was 
found at the scene of the alleged crime. The defence lawyer, Mr. Davies, raised the 
point that Adidas shoes are common and therefore the footprints are not necessarily 
those of the Defendant Adams. Upon questioning, Sergeant Sherman agreed that this 
is possible. 
The next witness called forth by Mr. Peterson for the prosecution was Ms Johnson. 
She testified that the broken 9 ct. gold necklace found at the scene of the alleged 
crime was identical to the one she gave to the defendant Sutton 4 years previous to the 
alleged crime. The defence lawyer, Mr. Tanner raised the point that the necklace was 
a very common style that many people wear and therefore the necklace found at the 
scene of the alleged crime did not necessarily belong to the Defendant Sutton. Ms 
Johnson agreed that it was a possibility. 
Mr. Peterson called forth Senior Constable Smithson as his next prosecution witness. 
Senior Constable Smithson testified that upon Defendant Adams' arrest one day after 
the alleged event, Defendant Adams had a deep purple bruise on his right cheekbone 
which appeared to him to be recently inflicted. Mr. Davies, in cross-examination of 
this witness, proposed to Senior Constable Smithson that the bruise may have been 
inflicted at a time other than the alleged assault, and Senior Constable Smithson 
agreed that this was possible. 
Senior Constable Smithson further testified that upon the Defendant Sutton's arrest 
one day after the alleged event, Defendant Sutton's gums were bleeding and one of 
his teeth was Chipped. Mr. Tanner, in cross examination, proposed to Senior 
Constable Smithson that the Chipped tooth and bleeding gums may not be the result 
of the alleged assault. Senior Constable Smithson agreed that this was possible. 
In Defendant Adams' defence, Mr. Davies called Defendant Adams' partner, Ms 
Simone Waters. She testified that on the date in question, Defendant Adams was with 
her. She reported that they parked the car along Barrack Street in the city that 
morning at approximately 1 Oam, and then walked to the Swan River foreshore to have 
a picnic. She further testified that they returned to the car at approximately 6.30 pm 
on the date in question, and then went home. In addition, Ms Waters testified that she 
was responsible for the Defendant Adams' bruise the day before the alleged event 
when she was intoxicated and became quite aggressive. In cross-examination, Mr. 
Peterson, elicited from Ms Waters that she had been drinking whiskey quite heavily 
from noon on the date in question. Upon further questioning it emerged that Ms 
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Waters was a chronic alcoholic, who drank at least one bottle of whiskey daily. The 
defence objected to this line of questioning, however, the judge overruled this, stating 
that the evidence was relevant to evaluate the credibility of the witness. Mr. Peterson 
suggested that Ms Waters' capacity to give evidence was questionable, as she was 
intoxicated not only on the date in question, but the surrounding days also. Mr. 
Peterson then proposed that there was the possibility that Defendant Adams may have 
left her for a short time and met up with the other three alleged assailants while she 
lay intoxicated in the park. Although she stated that she could not remember the exact 
events of the date in question, Ms Waters was sure that Defendant Adams was with 
her at all times. 
In Defendant Sutton's defence, Mr. Tanner called the Defendant Sutton's 
grandmother, Mrs. Roberts to testify. She testified that on the day in question, the 
Defendant Sutton arrived at her house at approximately 10:00 in the morning to help 
her look after her grandson, aged one and a half, for the majority of the day. At about 
4pm Mrs. Roberts testified that she realised the infant would soon be ready to take a 
nap so she told the Defendant Sutton to put the infant in his crib when he falls asleep, 
and then she went off for a nap herself. She testified that when she woke up at 7:00pm 
the Defendant Sutton was still there. By that time his gums were bleeding and one of 
his teeth was Chipped. Upon questioning him about the tooth, Mrs.Roberts testified 
that the Defendant Sutton told her that he was lying on the floor watching tv when the 
infant crawled over to him with a glass in his hand and dropped it on his face, 
consequently breaking his tooth off and causing his gums to bleed. In cross 
examination by the prosecutor Mr.Peterson, it was put to Mrs.Roberts that because 
she had been sleeping for part of the day in question, it was possible that the 
Defendant Sutton had actually left her house and committed the alleged crime. 
Further, because she had not actually seen the infant drop the glass on the Defendant 
Sutton's face, she could not be certain that this had actually caused the injury. 
Mrs.Roberts accepted that this was a possibility but was still sure that the Defendant 
Sutton had not actually left the house until later that evening and had sustained the 
injury from the infant as he was an active little boy. 
In summarising the prosecution's case against the Defendant Adams, Mr. Peterson 
stated that the sighting of Defendant Adams at the scene and his car near the scene of 
the alleged crime as well as his facial bruising and the footprint matching his brand of 
shoe, implied his involvement in the alleged event. He further stated that the alibi 
provided by Ms Waters was questionable, due to possible impairments stemming 
from her alcohol problem. 
In summarising the prosecution's case against the Defendant Sutton, Peterson stated 
that the sighting of the Defendant Sutton near the scene and at the scene of the alleged 
crime on the day in question, the injury to his tooth and gums, and a necklace similar 
to that previously worn by the Defendant Sutton found at the scene of the alleged 
crime implied his involvement in the alleged event. He further stated that the alibi 
provided by Mrs. Roberts was questionable as she had been sleeping for part of the 
day. 
In summarising the case for the defence of the Defendant Adams, Mr. Davies put 
forth that the evidence by the elderly Mrs.Wesley was questionable and the other 
items of evidence did not necessarily prove that the Defendant Adams had any 
involvement in the alleged offence. 
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In summarising the case for the defence of the Defendant Sutton, Mr. Tanner put forth 
that the evidence presented by the elderly Mrs. Wesley was questionable and the other 
items of evidence did not necessarily prove that the Defendant Sutton had any 
involvement in the alleged offence. 
The judge then explained to the jury that they must consider the case of each 
Defendant separately and that they are to reach independent verdicts for each of the 
two defendants. The judge further instructed that they must only find a defendant 
guilty if the evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that he was involved in its 
commission. 
APPENDIXJ 
RESPONSE SHEET FOR CONDITION 1 OF MAIN STUDY 
DEFENDANT A ONLY 
How do you find the defendant, Mr. Steven Adams, on the 
charge of unlawful assault? 
Please circle your verdict: Guilty Not Guilty 
How confident are you in your verdict? 
Please circle a number on the scale of 1 to 7: 
not very confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very confident 
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APPENDIXK 
RESPONSE SHEET FOR CONDITION 2 OF MAIN STUDY 
DEFENDANTS A AND B 
How do you find the defendant, Mr. Steven Adams, on the 
charge of unlawful assault? 
Please circle your verdict: Guilty Not Guilty 
How confident are you in your verdict? 
Please circle a number on the scale of 1 to 7: 
not very confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very confident 
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How do you find the defendant, Mr. George Bartlett, on the 
charge of unlawful assault? 
Please circle your verdict: Guilty Not Guilty 
How confident are you in your verdict? 
Please circle a number on the scale of 1 to 7: 
not very confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very confident 
APPENDIXL 
RESPONSE SHEET FOR CONDITION 3 OF MAIN STUDY 
DEFENDANTS A, B, AND C 
How do you find the defendant, Mr. Steven Adams, on the 
charge of unlawful assault? 
Please circle your verdict: Guilty Not Guilty 
How confident are you in your verdict? 
Please circle a number on the scale of 1 to 7: 
not very confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very confident 
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How do you find the defendant, Mr. George Bartlett, on the 
charge of unlawful assault? 
Please circle your verdict: Guilty Not Guilty 
How confident are you in your verdict? 
Please circle a number on the scale of 1 to 7: 
not very confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very confident 
How do you find the defendant, Mr. Sean Cole, on the 
charge of unlawful assault? 
Please circle your verdict: Guilty Not Guilty 
How confident are you in your verdict? 
Please circle a number on the scale of 1 to 7: 
not very confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very confident 
APPENDIXM 
RESPONSE SHEET FOR CONDITION 4 OF MAIN STUDY 
DEFENDANTS A AND D 
How do you find the defendant, Mr. Steven Adams, on the 
charge of unlawful assault? 
Please circle your verdict: Guilty Not Guilty 
How confident are you in your verdict? 
Please circle a number on the scale of 1 to 7: 
not very confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very confident 
How do you find the defendant, Mr. Greg Sutton, on the 
charge of grievous bodily harm? 
Please circle your verdict: Guilty Not Guilty 
How confident are you in your verdict? 
Please circle a number on the scale of 1 to 7: 
not very confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very confident 
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